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ABSTRACT 
In Latin America, the use of political violence against authoritarian regimes increased 
after the Cuban Revolution. In the 1970s, women began to join revolutionary movements 
in ever-growing numbers, to the point that the presence of female guerrillas or terrorists 
was no longer remarkable. The most important factors that influenced women to join 
insurgencies were political ideology, state and domestic violence, culture, social 
networks, and changes in guerilla tactics. Women took on various insurgency roles, 
including those of fighter, supporter, and sympathizer. The post-conflict repercussions of 
female participation in political violence vary, depending on the capacity of the 
demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration process. So far, however, U.S. military 
counterinsurgency doctrine has barely acknowledged this evolution in the gender make-
up of insurgencies. The increasing inclusion of females in U.S. combat military 
occupation specialties should allow the military more flexibility in the way it identifies, 
classifies, and approaches gender in conventional and counterinsurgency operations. 
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The Cold War and successful revolutions in Cuba (1959) and Nicaragua (1979) 
intensified and internationalized Latin America’s seemingly endemic political violence.1 
Young men and women—university students, peasants, or of indigenous minorities—
flocked to join insurgencies that promised to combat state repression, class domination, 
and social injustice.2 The reaction of many states, in the shadow of what they and the 
U.S. government saw as an international communist threat, was further to emphasize the 
historic focus of Latin American security forces on internal defense against ‘the enemy 
within.’ The result, however, was usually an increase in violence against the civilian 
population, which further fed instability and raised protests at home and abroad.3 
Beginning in the 1970s, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala were counted among the 
countries that experienced massacres, rape, and other acts of violence against civilians 
carried out by the security forces. The result of state violence was instability and 
revolutionary movements across Central America. In the 1980s, Colombia and Peru also 
witnessed an expansion of hitherto miniscule-armed groups financed with cash from 
illicit drugs, which challenged governmental control over great swaths of those countries. 
Men were, and continue to be, the main participants in these violent non-state 
organizations. However, from the 1970s, women began to join revolutionary movements 
in ever-larger numbers, to the point that the presence of female guerrillas or terrorists was 
no longer remarkable, even though their role and level of participation varied across time 
and organization. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-
EP) had no significant female participation among its leadership or fighters during its 
formation in 1964.4 However, women in the FARC surged to make up to thirty percent of 
                                                
1 Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of 
Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 16. 
2 Ibid., 23–28. 
3 Ibid., 60–65. 
4 Keith Stanski, “Terrorism, Gender, and Ideology: A Case Study of Women Who Join the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),” The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, 
and Root Causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2006): 140. 
 2 
the total fighting force by 2000.5 This stands in contrast to the experience of women 
during the Cuban Revolution in which only five percent of the guerrillas with Castro in 
the Sierra Maestra were females.6 Wickham-Crowley concurs that in Cuba (1958), “one 
in twenty Cuban guerrillas was female.”7 The participation of women increased in other 
parts of Latin America. In 1979, when civil war erupted in El Salvador, and women’s 
participation in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) reached nearly 
30 percent.8 
Females appear to be more attracted to leftist than to right-wing terrorist groups. 
For instance, in Nicaragua, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) had an 
estimated 30 percent female participation, while the Coalition of Nicaraguan 
Counterrevolutionary Groups (CONTRA) counted between seven and 15 percent.9 
Women were almost totally absent from the right-wing paramilitary groups that 
demobilized in Colombia from 2003 to 2006.10 The leftist umbrella organization, 
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), counted less than 20 percent of 
females in its ranks; perhaps because it was a largely indigenous organization in which 
women were not expected to bear arms.11 The absence of females as formal members of 
the organization does not mean that they were not active in providing logistical support, 
intelligence gathering, message transport, and other tasks. In the Zapatista Army of 
National Liberation (EZLN), an indigenous organization active in the southern Mexican 
                                                
5 Margaret, Gonzalez-Perez, Women and Terrorism: Female Activity in Domestic and International 
Terror Groups (London: Routledge, 2008), 41. 
6 Karen Kampwirth, Women and Guerrilla Movements: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas, and Cuba 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 118. 
7 Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution, 21. 
8 Jocelyn S. Viterna, “Pulled, Pushed, and Persuaded: Explaining Women’s Mobilization into the 
Salvadoran Guerrilla Army,” American Journal of Sociology 112, no. 1 (July 2006), 6, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/502690.  
9 Alexis Henshaw, “Why Women Rebel: Understanding Female Participation in Intrastate Conflict,” 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Arizona, 2013), 
http://arizona.openrepository.com/arizona/handle/10150/293429. 
10 Albert Carames and Eneko Sanz, “Colombia (AUC, 2003–2008),” in Carames and E. Sanz, DDR 
2009. Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World 
During 2008. Belterra: School for Culture of Peace, 2009, 53, 58. 
11 Kampwirth, Women and Guerrilla Movements, 4. 
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state of Chiapas since 1994, women contribute almost “one-third of the combatants, and 
half of the support base.”12  
The fact that large percentages of these insurgent organizations are made up of 
women should influence counterinsurgency strategies. Indeed, French counterinsurgency 
theorist David Galula argued that women were a key element in insurgency—even in a 
support role—and that one of the great shortcomings of French counterinsurgency in 
Algeria, was the failure to factor an appeal to women into their COIN strategies.13 While 
Galula exaggerated the neglect of French outreach to women in Algeria,14 Latin 
American countries, such as Colombia, have failed to include a female dimension into the 
counterinsurgency strategies.15 Nor are they unique.16  
This thesis seeks to answer three questions:  
• Why have women increasingly joined insurgent organizations in Latin 
America since the 1970s, especially those on the left, especially given that 
often where some of the most stalwart guerrillas and determined fighters 
have been women, even though women are seldom promoted into 
leadership positions?  
• Are women more prominent in Latin American insurgent groups than 
elsewhere (i.e., in the Viet Cong, Sri Lanka, Chechen insurgency, or in the 
many groups in Africa)?  
• Finally, which COIN strategies might be most effective in targeting 
females for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)? 
A. BACKGROUND 
The United States will continue to partner and assist Latin American states to 
combat international and domestic terrorism in support of common national security 
                                                
12 Ibid., 84. 
13 David Galula, Pacification in Algeria 1956–1958 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006), vi. 
14 Martin Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 94–95, 
112, 126, 173, 175, 234, 24-50, 254–55. 
15 Presidency of the Republic, “Democratic Security and Defense Policy,” Ministry of Defense, 2003, 
San Diego State University, 1–25, http://usregsec.sdsu.edu/docs/Colombia2003.pdf. 
16 It took the United States security forces in Afghanistan ten years before the USMC developed 
female engagement teams (FETs), and even then they were ad hoc formations with no clear strategic 
purpose or dedicated, specially trained personnel. Beyond building schools for girls and other minor 
wrinkles, a gender-based strategy was considered too controversial to apply in Muslim countries. FM 3-24 
Counterinsurgency contains no entry for women or female in its index. 
 4 
interests. Women are an essential part of leftist groups that threaten the stability of 
America’s partners and allies in Latin America. It is important to understand the role of 
this essential demographic inside society, armed groups, and in auxiliary support clusters. 
Persuading female combatants to reintegrate into society can also improve the quality of 
life for their families and communities. USAID’s Office of Women in Development 
recognizes that, “women’s participation in war contributes to a social transformation of 
identity and roles within the society.”17 In other words, in this view, a woman’s 
participation in an armed group is a bid for recognition of a status equal to that of men. 
Do women join these groups to gain status? Do they join for reasons such as ideological, 
individual, or coercion? If they believe that enlistment will enhance their status within 
their communities, as USAID obviously believes, is this in fact the case? Are women 
more likely to be disillusioned by life para el monte?18 
U.S. military assistance to Latin America began in World War II as a way to 
protect the South American continent from foreign encroachment, mainly German and 
Soviet. The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 prompted the U.S. to worry about the 
vulnerability of many Latin American states to the Communist overthrow, which became 
the source of the 1954 CIA orchestrated coup of the Jacobo Árbentz regime in 
Guatemala. Castro’s overthrow of the Batista regime in Cuba on New Year’s Eve in 1959 
became Washington’s wake-up call. Initiated in March 1961, the Alliance for Progress 
sent millions of dollars to Latin America, much of it to economic development, literacy 
campaigns, land redistribution, and democracy promotion. This financial support was 
sent on the theory that poverty and political disenfranchisement were the primary sources 
of discontent that was exploited by leftists to build a popular constituency for 
insurrection.19 
A Military Assistance Program (MAP) and other AID-funded programs also 
sought to prepare Latin American militaries, police, and intelligence organizations to 
                                                
17 Office of Women in Development, “Interstate Conflict and Gender Information Bulletin-9,” U.S. 
Agency for International Development, December 2000, 1–2. 
18 Para el monte: reference to the hardship of living in the jungle. 
19 John Charles Chasteen, Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 2011), 265, 266, 287, 288, 289. 
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confront internal subversion. The economic, military, and moral outcomes of those 
programs have become a subject of significant dispute among policy makers and scholars 
of the region. However, the impact of women in insurgency is a topic that is infrequently 
covered by security strategists, and has only recently begun to attract the attention of 
security experts. Therefore, the amount of information available about how military 
assistance programs and counterinsurgency strategies impact gender perceptions is 
limited. The United Nations calls for the integration of gender in strategic and operational 
planning of counterinsurgency; moreover, the report draws attention to the negative 
effects that some security measures are having on non-governmental organizations 
(NGO), women demobilization efforts, and reintegration of female combatants into 
society.20  
This thesis argues that women participation in insurgencies increased because of 
ideological shifts of male guerrilla leaders, the development of a social revolutionary 
culture, changes in guerrilla strategy, and a mix of personal factors. This work found that 
the Catholic Church and Liberation Theology support was a factor unique to the Latin 
American region, which influenced the expansion of women mobilization and provided 
resilience against government counterinsurgency efforts. This research also found that 
Andean insurgencies refusal to embrace religion hindered the capacity to gain mass 
mobilization and material support; therefore, the lack of resources shifted the 
organizations priorities to survivable tactics, like the trafficking of illicit drugs, rather 
than the pursuit of their political ideological goals. This study adds knowledge about the 
recruitment, roles, and integration at different levels of women in insurgent organizations 
by reviewing biographies, periodic accounts, and ex-combatant interview transcripts. 
Additionally, the United States Armed Forces can learn from the experience of women in 
combatant roles in low-intensity conflict. Formal Army and rebel groups differ in 
structure, legal status, and legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Still, each should 
consider the gender dimension of low-intensity conflict. While the role of women in 
                                                
20 Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Rafia Barakat, and Liat Shetret, “The Roles of Women in Terrorism, 
Conflict, and Violent Extremism: Lessons for the United Nations and International Actors-April 2013,” 
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 6, 13, 14, http://www.globalct.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/NCF_RB_LS_policybrief_1320.pdf. 
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irregular groups is at the center of the thesis, some of the conclusions might apply to 
women in regular state security forces. Therefore, the discussion of women in low-
intensity conflict is important as a means to understand the nature of society at war, and 
help evolve appropriate counterinsurgency and demobilization strategies. 
B. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY  
1. Hypothesis 
Research on women in armed insurgencies in Latin America suggests an increase 
in female participation during the 1970s, although variations in participation and 
differences in the level and nature of their contributions exist among leftist groups. There 
are three hypotheses that can explain these variations based on the literature that was 
analyzed: ideology, social conditions, and coercion. The first hypothesis is that women 
are drawn to groups whose ideology promises a greater degree of sexual equality. Right-
wing organizations like the Nicaraguan Contras, the Colombian autodefensas, and the 
criminal cartels, are more likely to see violence as an exclusively male preserve, and to 
view women in the traditions of Latin American machismo as part of the spoils of war. 
Additionally, the shift in women’s attitudes toward society, and female roles in the 
household, influenced their integration into insurgent groups. Furthermore, ideological 
shifts within the organization also account for the increase in women’s participation in 
insurgencies. 
The second hypothesis is that social conditions enabled the increase of women in 
violent organizations. Some of the grievances that women faced were the following: pay 
discrimination, domestic abuse, lack of education, and opportunities for upper mobility. 
These social conditions, combined with the demand for excitement and need to break out 
of their routine lives, pushed female peasants and middle-class students into leftist 
groups. 
The third hypothesis is that women are coerced into the armed struggle by 
violence from either the state or the insurgent groups. Women have often found 
 7 
themselves forced to defend their families and protect their traditions.21 In this scenario, 
households where women are primary wage earners became radicalized by a struggle for 
survival, rather than from ideology or mere poverty. On the other hand, in areas 
controlled by insurgent groups, young people are often conscripted or co-opted to act at 
the behest of insurgents. 
2. Methodology 
The main limitation for this study is accessibility to primary sources related to 
specific groups. Official data collection of activities of women in Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN), Shining Path (SL), and the Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation (EZLN), are not properly collected because women did not participate in 
formal DDR programs. On the other hand, the information on women combatants in El 
Salvador is more accurate and available because the FMLN did exit via a formal DDR 
process.22 The majority of the material for this study will depend on secondary sources 
and narrative information, rather than statistical data. The bulk of the information in 
articles and books was taken from original sources, which make finding variations 
problematic. However, these shortcomings are compensated for by numerous interviews 
and biographies of group leaders available online and in books.23 The National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism database provides 
valuable information regarding women terrorist attacks since the 1970s. 
Another potential challenge is that any discussion of women in insurgency covers 
multiple and diverse areas of study, such as gender studies, sociology, military history, 
and comparative politics. This study will benefit from the aforementioned diversity by 
incorporating work from all of these perspectives. This thesis will draw heavily on 
research by Karen Kampwirth and Alexis Henshaw about why women join revolutionary 
groups. 
                                                
21 Natalia Herrera and Douglas Porch, “Like Going to a Fiesta–the Role of Female Fighters in 
Colombia’s FARC-EP,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no. 4 (December 2008): 610, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310802462547. 
22 Kampwirth, Women and Guerrilla Movements, 4. 
23 Interviews, press releases, and other communication collected from Center for Documenting Armed 
Struggles in Latin America, http://www.cedema.org/index.php?ver=portada. 
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This study will examine the trajectory of female fighters through a comparative 
study of women in terrorist organizations in Latin America. The study will include 
women in non-state armed groups in the following countries: El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Colombia, and Peru. Based on the analysis of these cases, the 
argument will use Karen Kampwirth’s framework in Central America to examine why 
women joined guerilla movements in the whole Latin American region.24 The 
classification of the roles of women will follow Pamala L. Griset and Sue Mahan 
groupings, including sympathizers, spies, warriors, and dominant forces,25 in accordance 
with the typology of participation provided by Griset and Mahan. Additionally, this 
analysis will use Alexis Henshaw’s Gendered Theory of Rebellion, which merges 
theories of mobilization, based on grievances with feminist views, to study the 
motivations of women in rebel groups. Henshaw divides the grievances that enable 
mobilization of women into the following categories: economic, ethno-religious, 
political, and human security. These two similar approaches form the basis for this study. 
In addition, we provide reviews that detail variations in interpretation by comparing intra-
state terrorist groups. An effort was done to analyze women terrorist acts collected by the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
based at the University of Maryland, to provide other perspectives of the participation 
and roles.26 
In its analysis of counterterrorism strategies, the thesis is based on the review of 
secondary sources, NGO and government reports, military strategic plans, and other 
referenced sources.  
The findings are presented as follows. Chapter II will provide an overview of 
previous studies and conclusions on the subject. Chapter III will focus on the motivations 
                                                
24 Karen Kampwirth uses structural changes, ideological and organizational changes, political factors, 
and combination of all factors to explain demobilization in Central America. Karen Kampwirth, Women 
and Guerrilla Movements: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas, and Cuba (University Park, Pennsylvania, 
2002), 14. 
25 Pamala L. Griset and Sue Mahan, Terrorism in Perspective (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 
2009), 158–159. 
26 Global Terrorism Database is an open source database from 1970–2011. Currently has over 104,000 
cases categorized by country, regions, and searchable related words. 
 9 
of enlistment, which include political, ideological, and personal reasons. Chapter IV will 
focus on the roles and satisfaction of women insurgents. Chapter V will cover the 
importance of gender for U.S. military operations. Chapter VI will include a summary of 
findings, recommendations to policy makers, and suggestions for further research. 
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II. WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICAN INSURGENCIES 
To understand the participation of women in Latin American insurgencies, it is 
necessary to examine the most common explanations for the emergence of the 
revolutionary movements. Historically in Central America, poor social and economic 
conditions are generally thought to mobilize disenfranchised sectors of society behind 
revolutionary movements. This classic explanation is put forward by Walter LaFeber, 
who argues that revolutions in Central America were inevitable because of the economic 
and social grievances caused by internal and external neo-dependency on U.S. economic 
power.27 However, in his well-known book about the subject, Jeff Goodwin argued that 
social grievances alone were insufficient reasons to join a revolutionary group, have 
contested LaFeber’s conclusion.28 Rather, he finds that weak state institutions and 
repression are also important for explaining both the emergence of insurgent movements, 
and their success (or failure). These two explanations of the outbreak of Latin American 
revolutions and their success in attracting insurgents also influence how academics 
address the question of why women join terrorist organizations. 
Karen Jacques and Paul Taylor, from the Lancaster University, conducted a 
review of the literature written over the past 25 years that analyzes women in terrorism. 
The authors found that 70 percent of all work on female terrorism analyzes female 
terrorism after 2002.29 The authors divided the literature into six categories: “portrayal in 
media; feminism; interviews with terrorists; group roles; motivations and recruitment; 
and environmental enablers (access to target, etc.).”30 Furthermore, they argue that the 
study of women in terrorism is an “un-integrated body of knowledge spread across many 
                                                
27 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: Norton, 
1983), 13–20. 
28 Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 143. 
29 Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, "Female Terrorism: A Review,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
21, no. 3 (2009): 502, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550902984042. 
30 Ibid., 499. 
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disciplines.”31 One of the key observations made by Jacques and Taylor is that academics 
described the issue, rather than explaining why women join insurgent groups.32 Literature 
on Latin American women varies in quality and quantity. For instance, information about 
El Salvador’s FMLN is numerous because of the disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration processes after the peace agreement. On the other hand, information about 
the Nicaraguan right-wing groups, like the CONTRAS, is scarce. 
Some scholars argue that female socio-economical grievances did not suddenly 
change; however, the effects of ideology, religious convictions, and migration/dislocation 
altered gender roles, constraints, and expectations that radicalized many women and 
persuaded them to join armed groups.33 For instance, in Mexico, females who joined the 
Zapatista Army for National Liberation (EZLN) felt empowered by a series of social and 
political changes in their communities that freed them from normative roles and patterns 
of family structure.34 
Literature by Linda M. Lobao, David T. Mason, and Linda L. Reif concurs that 
social roles and sexual division of labor limits the participation of females in armed 
groups. Lobao argues that during the early stages of the insurgencies female participation 
was less, because society in general restricted them to roles and tasks different from those 
of men.35 Reif reinforces this idea by attributing the limits of female roles in Latin 
American to patriarchal control of activities outside the house.36 Reif also posits that, 
“women’s role in reproductive activities thus constitutes a major barrier to their 
involvement in nondomestic political action such as guerrilla struggle.”37 On the other 
hand, in her study of guerrilla groups in Central America, Karen Kampwirth found that 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 511. 
33 Kampwirth, Women and Guerrilla Movements, 14–15. 
34 Ibid., 93–94. 
35 Linda M. Lobao, “Women in Revolutionary Movements: Changing Patterns of Latin American 
Guerrilla Struggle,” Dialectical Anthropology 15, no. 2–3 (1990): 211–212, 
http://link.springer.com.libproxy.nps.edu/article/10.1007/BF00264654#. 
36 Linda L. Reif, “Women in Latin American Guerrilla Movements: A Comparative Perspective,” 
Comparative Politics 18, no. 2 (January 1986): 147–149, http://www.jstor.org/stable/421841. 
37 Ibid., 148. 
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the emergence of social organizations, and changes to them, helped overcome the 
limiting factors Reif and Lobao studied.38 She also found that women were drawn to 
armed groups through religious organizations that advocated for women movements and 
social organization. Additionally, she argued that migration patterns were critical in 
radicalizing women in urban and rural settings.39 In general, their conclusions were that a 
breakdown or significant alteration in gender roles had to occur before women joined 
armed groups in Latin American.  
Kampwirth, Lobao, and Reif also argued that the increase in female participation 
in armed groups in the 1970s and 1980s occurred following a significant opening of 
political space and association for females through women’s networks and work 
organizations. Furthermore, in his study of El Salvador and Nicaraguan revolutionary 
forces, David Mason found that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were critical in 
expanding women’s networks and arming them with the skills necessary for later 
participation inside leadership position in the armed groups.40 NGOs proved powerful 
actors in Latin America, and helped the expansion and communication of feminist ideals. 
More recently, organizations like Amnesty International helped provide an outlet where 
women in Chiapas, El Salvador, and Colombia could express grievances, and receive 
support from transnational actors. The strengthening of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and United Nations (UN) helped to bring attention through annual reporting 
on women rights and human rights violations. The communication channels and work 
programs focused on women helped connect the rural and the urban female communities.  
Despite the fact that these transnational organizations aimed to offer a conduit for 
women to become more politically and socially active through non-violent activities, only 
a minority joined insurgent groups for political or personal reasons. However, their 
experience inside those organizations seems to have heightened their awareness of the 
need for more female participation in governance. For instance, in El Salvador, former 
                                                
38 Kampwirth, Women and Guerrilla Movements, 8–12. 
39 Ibid., 15–19. 
40 David T. Mason, “Women’s Participation in Central American Revolutions: A Theoretical 
Perspective,” Comparative Politics Studies 25, no. 1 (1992): 79, http://cps.sagepub.com/content/25/1/63. 
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female guerrilla leaders were instrumental in incorporating woman rights into their new 
constitution. Lobao, Kampwirth, and Gonzalez-Perez, found that integration of reforms 
occurred favoring gender equality occurred when the male leaders had contact with 
female militants or NGOs with feminist agendas.41 
Alexis Henshaw developed a gendered theory of rebellion to explain, “why 
women rebel?”42 Similar to that of Kampwirth and Mason, her argument is that a 
combination of circumstances and personal issues, as well as threats to one’s family or 
existence, are critical motivations for women to join groups. Nevertheless, she concluded 
that women would be less active in leadership positions because joining became an end in 
itself, rather than a means for achieving their goals.43 Henshaw’s Doctoral dissertation 
“Why Women Rebel: Understanding Female Participation in Intrastate Conflict,” is one 
of the most ambitious works reviewed. Henshaw carried out a comparative analysis of 
women in over seventy rebel groups active in the post-Cold War era, and concluded that 
non-combat roles continued to be the primary function of women in insurgencies. 
Henshaw found that the use of women in noncombat roles in Latin American terrorist 
groups led eventually to greater participation in leadership and even combat roles.44 
Rebel groups in other regions, where women did not participate fully in supporting roles 
in insurgencies, saw fewer women in leadership or combat.45  
Henshaw also argued that, “women’s empowerment is more frequently a product 
of, rather than a factor contributing to, women’s involvement in armed rebellion.”46 This 
last argument contradicts Keith Stanski and Douglas Porch’s observation that women 
joined insurgencies in Colombia because of the sense of empowerment that the 
organizations seemed to promise, while some became disillusioned with the constant 
abuses and lack of upper mobility. Indeed, Herrera and Porch argue that some women 
                                                
41 Lobao, “Women in Revolutionary Movements,” 215. 
42 Henshaw, “Why Women Rebel,” 16. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 180–182. 
45 Ibid., 178. 
46 Ibid. 
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joined the FARC in Colombia precisely because they felt that uniforms and weapons 
gave them power and status.47 In keeping with the spirit of Henshaw’s argument, the 
FARC then continues this sense of empowerment by giving them jobs like nurse or radio 
operator that makes them feel they are important to the success of the organization.48 
Literature is scarce about intra-state variations in Latin America. However, 
Andrea Mendez’s doctoral dissertation provides some evidence of variations among the 
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the FARC. Mendez found that “to a 
certain extent, women in the [paramilitary forces] AUC had the ability to choose if they 
wanted to be treated differently.”49 Herrera and Porch found that females in the FARC 
felt that they had to work harder to gain respect from their male colleagues and even 
outperform them in many tasks.50 In the case of the FARC, women excelled more in 
gathering intelligence, propaganda, popular outreach, and recruitment of other females.51 
Herrera and Porch also emphasized the role of the female sexuality inside the FARC, to 
the point that the “FARC’s success and survivability are centered on the sexual services 
provided by female guerrillas.”52 However, sexuality is a double-edge sword for the 
FARC because it often becomes a source of jealously, unhappiness, and disillusion, 
especially when couples are broken up when they become too emotionally attached.53 
This may fit a paradigm of sexual violence in Colombia that Cockburn argues, “is 
endemic against women and used by three main actors: guerrilla, armed forces, and 
paramilitary forces.”54  
                                                
47 Herrera and Porch, “Like Going to a Fiesta,” 616. 
48 Ibid., 620. 
49 Andrea Mendez, “Militarized Gender Performativity: Women and Demobilization in Colombia’s 





52 Herrera and Porch, “Like Going to a Fiesta,” 622–625. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Cynthia Cockburn, From Where we Stand: War, Women's Activism and Feminist Analysis (London; 
New York: Zed Books, 2007), 16. 
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The issue of reproduction is contentious and leads to abuse and abortions in both 
organizations; however, the AUC remained more flexible when it came to motherhood, 
often because they operated from towns and women were fewer in number and less 
central to organizational success. Furthermore, Keith Stanski argues that the FARC’s 
control over pregnancy does not promote equality of gender, since it only applied to the 
females, who in most instances had to abort.55 An Amnesty International report 
condemned the grave situation of gender and sexual human rights violations in Colombia 
armed groups.56 Pregnant combatants often flee because of threat against them of forced 
abortion.57 Indeed, the FARC’s attitude is that pregnancy is an ill-disguised desertion 
attempt. However, even if they succeed in escaping the armed group’s control, females 
struggle to reintegrate into society, both because they lack skills and because they carry 
the stigma of service in armed groups, where promiscuity reigns. 
In Central America, Karen Kampwirth found that females join guerrilla groups 
because of changes in the household structure (women became head of the household), 
migration patterns (urban versus rural), and changes in religion (liberation theology).58 In 
case of the FMLN, women grew were about 4,492 women at the time of demobilization 
in 1994.59 Kampwirth argued that the FMLN female ranks were full of peasants who 
fought for better life conditions more than for female equality,60 although one would 
seem to imply the other. Additionally, she reasoned that the conduit for women to join 
armed groups in El Salvador was the influence of the church (liberation theology), and 
the participation in unions and other existing networks. Forced migration and family 
traditions and loyalties rounded off the reasons for enlistment.61 Kampwirth found that 
                                                
55 Stanski, “Terrorism, Gender, and Ideology,” 148. 
56 “Colombia: Scarred Bodies, Hidden Crimes: Sexual Violence Against Women in the Armed 
Conflict,” Amnesty International, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR23/040/2004/en/eeb9c46a-
d598-11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/amr230402004en.html. 
57 Douglas Porch and María José Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: 
Transformation or Transition?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 6 (June 13, 2008): 530, 
doi:10.1080/10576100802064841. 
58 Kampwirth, Women and Guerrilla Movements, 151–156. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 59–60. 
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personal convictions acquired through family tradition of resistance were important for 
women joining the FMLN.62 Likewise, Ilja A. Luciak argued that family suffering and 
threats of violence pushed young females to see the armed struggle as necessary to 
progress.63  
Gunhild Schwitalla, Luisa Maria Dietrich, Keith Stanski, Douglas Porch, and 
Ingvild Magnaes Gjelsvik all argue that women view enlistment in armed groups as an 
escape from dreary lives circumscribed by poverty. The feeling of power, adrenaline, and 
participation in an armed group is attractive when life’s prospects are otherwise so 
limited. Specifically, women in their teens and early twenties were drawn to armed 
groups for social, political, and personal reasons.64 According to sexual violence reports, 
domestic abuse in rural areas of Colombia is one of the main reasons they feel compelled 
to join armed groups.65 The World Health Organization (WHO) concluded that, in 
Colombia, approximately 20 percent of women were victims of domestic violence.66 
Joining insurgent groups filled females with a false sense of empowerment by escaping a 
role of submission and victimhood in their communities. Accordingly to Stanski, the 
FARC offers women a “life of adventure and meaning, as well as a sense of gender 
equality (in both training and enforcement of discipline), that could not be found in 
civilian society.”67 Women joined the FARC because of family ties, revenge, custom, and 
to improve living conditions.68 Similarly, Ingvild Magnaes Gjelsvik, found that 
Colombian females joined because of socioeconomic and political reasons, coercion, and 
to seek refuge from domestic violence. Gjelsvik argued that men and women have similar 
                                                
62 Ibid., 60. 
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65 Gunhild Schwitall and Luisa Maria Dietrich, “Demobilisation of Female Ex-combatants in 
Colombia,” Forced Migration Review: Sexual Violence: Weapon of War, Impediment to Peace, no. 27 
(2007), 58–59, http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR27/full.pdf. 
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reasons to join the groups; however, the main difference among them is the degree in 
which empowerment influences the decision to join.69  
Herrera and Porch found that women guerrilla members have a sense of 
fulfillment and retain an optimistic outlook.70 They found that the “relative freedom and 
control over their choices in the FARC and the subordinate position held by women in 
Colombian society makes reintegration into civilian life especially difficult for former 
guerrillas [fighters].”71 Additionally, in terms of recruiting, the FARC had the 
psychological advantage by promoting a gender-neutral environment.72 The FARC’s 
recruitment is overwhelmingly rural for the following reasons: the recruiting pool for 
armed groups is in remote areas far from government control, females join to escape 
domestic violence or rural poverty and limited prospects, and because participation in 
guerrilla is seen as normal in areas under insurgent control.73 
Kampwirth also found that middle class women were more active in the city 
because of the universities created space for participation; for instance the education level 
of the women joining varied.74 Kampwirth cites Maruja Barring’s finding that “57 
percent of the women [in Peru Shining Path] had a college degree, ten percent had a 
professional degree or had completed postgraduate studies, something only four percent 
of the men had done.”75 One can posit that schools and universities were hotbeds of 
indoctrination and recruitment for the SL among a relatively well-off group of females.  
Academics note that female combatants are more vulnerable than males during 
the reintegration because they suffer more from persecution, abuse, and family 
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disruption. Schwitalla and Dietrich, report that for many demobilized a “return to their 
families is out of the question.”76 They also highlight that “85 percent of those who 
individually chose to leave armed groups . . . live [later] in Bogotá and Medellín.”77 
Women who may have fled domestic violence obviously have little incentive to seek 
reintegration in their families. Going home is simply to embrace the same constraints and 
lack of opportunity that put them on the road in the first place. Linda M. Lobao agrees 
with Jane S. Jaquette’s argument that “Latin American family is an effective institution of 
social control and it has been attacked by radical movements supporting social change.”78  
Ernesto Che Guevara wrote the following about women in guerrilla movements: 
“The woman is capable of performing the most difficult tasks of fighting beside the 
men…”79 However, even Guevara, a symbol of the revolution, dismissed the women’s 
role as leader or combatant. He later contended that women’s role should be one of 
logistical support and spying because of their persuasive ways with men.80 The literature 
discredits Guevara’s notion of females as only supporters, and exposes their contributions 
as fighters and strategists. 
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III. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENLISTMENT 
I chose to do politics in a country where doing politics implies violence. 
—Tanja Nijmeijer, 
member of the Colombian guerrilla group Revolutionary Armed Forces 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The motivation of Latin American females to join insurgencies varies with 
individual and by the willingness of insurgent organizations to accept and utilize them. 
Karen Kampwirth’s research on Central American insurgencies found that motivations 
depended on the country, age group, prior existing networks, religious beliefs, ideology, 
expectations of security, family structure, and social status.81 However, as a general 
proposition, the argument of this chapter is that the increase in female participation in 
insurgencies in Latin America from the 1960s occurred for four main reasons. First was 
the increased ideological appeal of the Left in the wake of the Cuban Revolution as some 
households and communities, religious groups, and political parties, found Fidel Castro’s 
experiment attractive. Second, guerrilla organizations began to reach out to entire 
communities, not simply to military age males. As females were part of the community, 
they were actively recruited by many insurgent organizations that empowered them by 
assigning them important roles. Third was a shift in gender relationships in a society in 
which women increasingly took control of their lives and choices. Finally, there were 
personal reasons for enlistment, the most important being domestic abuse and family 
relationship. 
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B. IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS IN WAKE OF CUBAN REVOLUTION 
1. Revolutionary Counterculture and Liberation Theology 
a. Revolutionary Counterculture 
The formation of Central and Southern American countries after the Spanish 
American wars of independence created a region full of political and racial contradictions 
that continue to prevail. Huge variations in wealth caused the dispossessed and their 
middle class advocates to find inspiration in the Cuban Revolution as a mechanism to 
change the status quo in Latin America. Revolutionary Cuba under Fidel Castro also 
actively promoted revolution in Latin American with training and equipment to would-be 
insurgents. However, Cuban sponsorship was not the primary factor, which saw an uptick 
of insurgent activity in the region. Rather, revolutionaries were able to leverage social, 
economic, and political conditions to promote the cause of violent change. 
Some of the factors that contributed to challenges to the status quo in Central and 
South America were inequality, corruption, authoritarian regimes, political oppression, 
economic and racial divisions, and the foreign exploitation of agrarian-based economies. 
Marxist-Leninism and Liberation Theology provided the ideological framework that 
rationalized the decision of men and women to fight against regime viewed as corrupt or 
undemocratic. The key point is that these ideologies shifted the strategic thinking of the 
male leaders of the organizations, which caused them to see the utility of the participation 
of women in the revolutionary insurgency. Male leaders also saw a force multiplier 
advantage to having women in their organizations. Revolutionary movements in El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala included female participation in all levels during the 
conflict. However, during the negotiation and post reconstruction process, female issues 
were seldom addressed which led to fractures and the creation of new female advocacy 
organizations. For example, during the post–conflict period in Nicaragua, the FSLN male 
leadership and women advocates disagreed over issues like female participation in the 
armed forces, abortion, and the role of women in politics.82 The majority of the women 
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returned to household roles performed before joining the insurgency. Others continued 
their political activism in women’s organizations within the FSLN. From 1979 to 2007, 
female organizational skills and persistence paid off, according to Kampwirth: “far more 
women have been elected to the National Assembly representing the FSLN than any 
other party . . . they comprised 65.85 percent.”83 The shift in ideology helped the FSLN 
gain support and greater legitimacy. 
The creation of a revolutionary counter culture has its roots in the Spanish 
American wars of independence. The consolidation of the former colonies continues to 
see violence exacerbated by ideological struggle of liberalism versus conservatism. The 
legacy of social divisions, European violence, and lack of developed liberal ideas led to 
the instability of post-independence politics. 
Identity shifts of Spanish-born Europeans, Blacks, and indigenous contributed to 
violent uprisings that resulted in the later independence wars. Signal of this change can 
be seen in early independent revolts. For example, Father Miguel Hidalgo sought to rally 
Mexican peasants by framing the narrative of revolt as one between Creoles and 
Peninsulars.84 Hidalgo’s uprising is significant not only for its defiance of imperial rule, 
but also for highlighting the key grievances of the peasantry, land rights foremost among 
them.85 Land ownership in the Americas continues to be one of the main grievances in 
the countryside. The modernization of agriculture systems, which favors land 
consolidation, the spread of cattle ranching, and the migration of workers to cities have 
altered the peasantry’s relationship to the land. However, the lack of land titles, especially 
in the wake of civil wars, has caused considerable displacement of populations, and 
continues to be an issue in Peru, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Chiapas. 
The wars of independence spawned two main currents of ideology. In a 
nineteenth century context, liberalism was seen as progressive because it promoted 
independence, individual liberty, equality of opportunity, economic development, 
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parliamentary systems of government, and it tended to be secular and hence anti-clerical. 
Nevertheless, it remained very much an ideology of elites, which excluded minority 
groups like Blacks and indigenous people. The main problem for liberals was that the 
newly independent Latin American states lacked institutions to implement the liberal 
agenda. The overwhelmingly agricultural economy and inability to produce manufactured 
goods stymied development. Political and social friction led to violence and civil wars 
that were too often resolved, if only temporarily, with the emergence of caudillos.86 Intra-
state wars were also a feature of post-independence Latin America, like for instance the 
War of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation (1836–1839), and that of the Triple Alliance 
(1865–1870). 
The mercantilist legacy of Spain and Portugal left Latin America commerce 
underdeveloped. Following the revolution, free trade attracted foreign investment, which 
propelled infrastructure, communication, and importation of technology. However, with 
little capital of their own, the former colonies relied on investment from a broad, so that 
their assets, such as they were, were mortgage to foreign interests. A fractured and weak 
region had little choice but to acknowledge U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere.87 
Modernization, such as it was, seldom trickled down to peasants and the poor. E. 
Bradford Burns argues, “[elites] always identified (and confused) class well-being with 
national welfare.”88 Furthermore, the transition to independence and the opening of 
markets challenged the landowners to produce crops for export. What little indigenous 
industry that existed was swamped with cheap goods from abroad. The economic 
dependency on U.S. and foreign investment required an alignment of political ideology of 
capitalism.89 The so-called “imported progress”90 was resisted by some and viewed with 
mistrust by others. Land reform and property laws remain the one issue that seems to lie 
at the root of all the insurgencies in Latin America since the nineteenth century. 
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Peasants displaced by export-oriented agriculture practices migrated to cities in 
search of jobs and security. However, reform met with entrenched resistance, often 
backed in Central America by the muscle of the United States. For instance, a peasant 
rebellion in El Salvador in 1932 led by Agustín Faribundo Martí (who later inspired the 
name for the FMLN) and the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS) produced a violent 
civil war as known as La Matanza or The Killing, in which “some 30,000 men, women, 
and children were killed to ensure that El Salvador’s rulers would not soon be confronted 
with another uprising, and to intimidate the lower classes generally.”91 In mid-twentieth 
century Latin America, the modernization of agriculture combined with the perceived 
corruption of the state, a lack of upward mobility, education, healthcare, and safety net 
programs, combined with an anti-U.S. sentiment to make insurgency seem an attractive 
option to many in the region. 
The era of the Cold War also contributed to the revolutionary culture that affected 
the region. The story of multinational industrial corporations moving into agrarian based 
countries imposing new economic model, plundering resources like land, and causing 
cyclical unemployment became common throughout the region. John Charles Chasteen 
has argued that the “expansion of multinational corporations was a natural development 
of global capitalism . . . [that] any kind of Latin American economic nationalism was 
therefore ‘un-American,’ something to be combated.”92 Washington associated economic 
prosperity with national security. Therefore, ideologies that hindered the development of 
multinational corporations were also considered a threat. The United States pressured 
Latin American countries through the Organization of American States (OAS) to combat 
communist and Marxist threats.93 
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In 1954, the OAS issued the Declaration of Caracas, saying that all 
Marxist revolutionary ideology was necessarily alien to the Western 
Hemisphere . . . [therefore] would be treated as a foreign invasion.94  
Marxism, at least in the abstract, was attractive to peasants, sympathetic 
revolutionary elites, and later religious leaders, because it provided an explanation that fit 
the perceived history of exploitation of classes. Marxism combined with Leninist theory 
of imperialism informed the bedrock beliefs of Leftist political parties and insurgent 
groups who opposed militaristic and authoritarian regimes in Central and South America. 
But ideology, while much debated, was hardly something that could provoke revolt on its 
own. An anti-U.S. sentiment also appealed to nationalists, who argued that Washington 
maintained their corrupt leaders in power. As J. Michael Waller argues, “The unifying 
theme [of people in the FMLN] to generate mass support was not ideology, but the 
corruption and injustices of the pro-Western governments under attack.”95 While many of 
the leaders of the left were men, women were extremely active. For instance, in her study 
of insurgency worldwide, Alexis Henshaw included those groups in Latin America, and 
found that “the numbers for redistributive movements, at 84.2 percent [non-combat role], 
and 52.6 percent [combat role] respectively, were significantly higher than the averages, 
and appeared to confirm earlier observations that women appeared to be more active in 
Leftist movements.”96 She also found, “that a Leftist, redistributive ideology along 
Marxist or Socialist lines has a strong, positive relationship to rates of female 
participation.”97 In sum, Henshaw confirms that Marxism Left-leaning ideology increases 
the participation in all aspects of the organization.  
The promise of social, gender, and class equality imported by European thinkers 
like Marx was intriguing for women and incorporated by men into the insurgencies. In 
1868, Karl Max wrote to a friend, “Everyone who knows anything of history also knows 
that great social revolutions are impossible without the feminine ferment. Social progress 
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may be measured precisely by the social position of the fair sex.”98 The FARC-EP, SL, 
EZLN, FSLN, URNG, and FMLN used ideology as a recruitment tool for women. In 
Central American insurgencies, Kampwirth found that the possibility of class equality 
influenced women into the insurgencies in greater numbers rather than feminism.99 The 
following are three quotes highlighted by Iljia A. Luciak of revolutionary organizations 
appealing to females: 
The following is from a FMLN Letter of principals and objectives: 
The construction of a true democracy entails the full realization of women 
and their creative participation in all spheres of national life. This is a 
fundamental principle in the societal program for which the FMLN fights. 
We have a commitment to win equal rights for women, [and] to overcome 
their marginalization and oppression in Salvadoran society.100 
The following is from the FSLN Historical Program: 
The Sandinista revolution will abolish the detestable discrimination that 
women have suffered with regard to men [and] establish economic, 
political, and cultural equality between women and men.101 
The following is a statement from the URNG: 
To the Guatemalan woman has to be guaranteed, under conditions of 
equality, her full participation in political, civil, economic, social, and 
cultural life, and the eradication of every form of gender and sex 
discrimination that constitutes an obstacle for full display of her talents 
and potential in support of the development and progress of the 
country.102  
These organizations promoted gender equality in theory. However, the reality 
based on the ex-guerrillas’ account could be quite different. Marta and Liliana, 
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demobilized fighters, were abducted by FARC-EP when still minors. Both claimed to 
have been beaten and raped just days after arriving in the insurgent camps by the 
commanders.103 Marta later recalled that being raped soon after arrival “was the rule 
rather than the exception.”104 
In summary, the revolutionary culture of Latin American countries was a result of 
political, economic, and social conditions that predated the Cuban Revolution. The Cuban 
government provided inspiration, material, and organizational skills for groups to unite 
and plan from Cuba. The authoritarian abuses and corruption of many regimes gave 
legitimacy to religious, communists, Marxists, and general political resistance. The 
emergence of Communist organizations and Marist-Leninist inspired insurgencies 
appealed to women because of the prospect to remove the regime and improve their lives. 
The overlay of ideology onto what had been traditional peasant ferment from the 1960s 
encouraged the insurgencies to open their ranks to women.  
b. Liberation Theology 
The first thing we discovered was that the parish is not the church 
building or a certain geographical space with all its inhabitants, but 
rather a community of brothers and sisters who visit one another, pray 
together, and help on another in hard times, as members of the family of 
God. 
–Félix Jimenez 
Spanish former priest 
The Church is one of the most resilient institutions in Latin America. The 
emergence of liberation theology in what historically had been an extremely conservative 
institution dedicated to preserving the status quo in economic as well as gender 
relationships, exposed women to ideas that heretofore had been available only to men and 
intellectuals. While the term “liberation theology” was only coined in 1971, it represented 
a movement that emerged in 1950–1960 Latin America that held that it was the Church’s 
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duty to “liberate” the faithful from social injustice and poverty. Until denounced by the 
Rome’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in the 1980s, Liberation theology was 
represented a shift in ideology that influenced men in insurgencies to open up the ranks 
for women participation. Inspired by this new doctrine, the institution of the Church now 
provided women with a space to organize, gain political and leadership skills, and served 
in many instances as collaborators and a center of recruitment for women to join the 
insurgency. The following section will provide an historical background that explains the 
influence of the Church in the life of women, the development of liberation theology, and 
how it contributed to them to enlist. 
Since the conquest, the Catholic Church influenced every level of society. With 
the help of the religious order of Franciscans, the takeover of the Yucatan region by 
Spaniards went through a strong inquisition to convert indigenous souls, who struggled 
unsuccessfully to keep their identity and religion. Led by Diego de Landa, the 
Franciscans attacked people’s identity, while at the same time subjugated them to 
European control through ideology, which kept the region stable for “three long 
centuries.”105 John Chasteen characterized these events as “an earthly and spiritual 
conquest, the defeat of the old gods.”106 The religious leaders and the encomendados 
contributed to the inequality among the people, by claiming spiritual authority over the 
natives and imported black slaves.107 The Church, therefore, reinforced European 
superiority by giving it divine sanction. One just has to examine the Requerimiento 
(requirement), an early version of a modern Miranda Rights declaration, to understand 
that religion was a central tool of the colonization process, which established the 
superiority of European culture, discredited indigenous practices, and cemented the social 
and economic hierarchy.108 It is hard not to find in Latin America a capital city that does 
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not have a Catholic Church near the Presidential Palace or center of power. The initial 
organization of the cities evolved around a plaza, which had a designated place for a 
Church. Religious activities dominated the calendar and while Church rituals set the tone 
and rhythm of local life.109 The Church represented an essential tool of conquest and 
subsequently for social control. 
In many instances, the members of the Church were given encomiendas 
themselves. Friar Bartolomé de Las Casas, as many other religious leaders, was given 
many encomiendas, which he converted to Catholicism and later openly advocated for 
humane treatment of indigenous peoples in Spanish courts.110 The idea of better 
conditions for the oppressed remained present in Church teachings throughout the 
centuries, although it may have seldom been applied in practice. In 1968, the Latin 
American Bishops Conference (CELAM) concluded that to confront poverty required 
radical changes in Latin America.111 The liberation of men no longer meant only 
spiritual—they agreed that the Church should “[give] preference to the poorest and most 
needy sectors.”112 Among the many topics covered, they concluded that the conditions in 
Latin America could lead to violence and radical mobilization.113 
The most significant aspect that came out of the aforementioned conference was 
the Ecclesial Base Communities (CEBs). The CEBs decentralized groups in the 
communities of approximately 30 people, which tried to apply biblical teaching to their 
work, family, and even political views.114 The Church influenced women by organizing 
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self-help groups. For example, in Nicaragua, the Church created an environment where 
women felt safe and were able to exchange ideas, and even recruited other Sandinistas.115 
“[In El Salvador], Participation in Christian “base communities” brought many urban and 
middle-class women into rural communities to lead Bible discussions and to perform 
services like sewing, teaching literacy skills, and offering health advice.”116 In El 
Salvador, religious organizations also operated many refugee camps during the Civil 
War, where indoctrination and political radicalization of women occurred. Former U.S. 
Ambassador to El Salvador, Edwin G. Corr, observed, “a characteristic of all the refugee 
camps was that only housed women, children and elderly men . . . These camps were 
channels for providing food, medicine and even arms to FMLN guerrilla units.”117 Nydia 
Díaz, prominent female guerrilla fighter in the FMLN and later legislator in El Salvador, 
started her radicalization at a very young age by doing social work influenced by 
liberation theorist teaching at her school.118 Jocelyn S. Viterna, found that women 
mobilization often occurred by religious networks and family ties with people inside the 
Christian organizations.119 The CEBs became common practice across Central America 
shifting the way women interacted, learned about religion and politics, and organized. 
Kampwirth found that religious mobilization contributed to the mobilization of 
women in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Chiapas. She reasoned that the lack of similar 
religious community based organizations like the CEBs in Cuba, where liberation 
theology did not exist, could explain the low participation of women in the Cuban 
revolution.120 Contrary to Kampwirth’s framing of the role of religion, Ilja Luciak argues 
that liberation theology hindered attention to women’s issues and limited their 
participation because of the patriarchal tradition of the Catholic Church.121 Luciak argues 
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that the incorporation of radical ideas about gender in the revolution and women’s rights 
occurred while the political cadre interacted with feminist movement ideals in other 
countries.122 Viterna and Kampwirth do agree on the importance of pre-existing networks 
as a contributing factor for mobilization. Viterna points out “Being in a participation-
supporting network therefore increases an individual’s probability of mobilization, but 
does not guarantee it.”123 The explanation then is that pre-existing networks in general 
contribute to women mobilization and not necessary the nature of religious ideology. 
Liberation theology in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Chiapas targeted women for 
mobilization. The institution and structure of the Church filled gaps of government 
outreach. In Chiapas for example, the church based communities advocated for women 
emancipation and worked arduously to mobilize them to improve their lives. The Church 
often preached about the equality of man and women. However, the impact of the 
organization improved the organizational and leadership skills of females inside their 
communities.124 
In summary, the liberation theology message of change and empowerment 
resonated with women and encouraged them to break away from standard roles of a 
patriarchal society, although not in all areas. Church leaders influenced by liberation 
theology assisted overtly and covertly the insurgency because of shifts in religious 
theology that advocated for the poor and labeled the regimes practices as unjust. The 
leaders of insurgent organizations naturally saw in these organizations a way of growing 
support by rapidly overcoming patriarchal barriers that limited female participation. The 
religious groups provided women with the experience organizing and political 
indoctrination required for the people’s revolutionary war tactics and strategies discussed 
in the following section. 
If we analyze additional cases comparatively, religious motivation has not been as 
crucial as Kampwirth claims. Despite a lack of liberation theology in Colombia and Peru, 
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a large number of women joined insurgent movements in those countries. In the case of 
the FARC and SL, their Marxist discipline rejected religion and any other authority that 
competed with their organizations. Carlos Ivan Degregori wrote on the subject of 
Sendero Luminoso and religion: 
The religious clash merits particular comment. According to del Pino 
(1996), the senderistas were exasperated by the militant zeal of the 
Protestant Evangelicals (who won considerable converts in the 
countryside) and their refusal “to serve two masters.” As for Andean 
religion and popular Catholicism, Shining Path considered such beliefs 
archaic and disgusting, and actively tried to suppress community rituals 
and fiestas.125 
2. Guerrilla Mobilization Strategies 
Although guerrilla fighting in Latin America benefited from the Cuban experience 
in ideology and material support, the theory of Che Guevara foquismo was not exportable 
to other countries in Latin America, especially those who faced strong military regimes 
backed up by U.S. security and cooperation programs. The need to change from a small 
group insurrection to a more popular people’s war, similar to that in Vietnam in the 
1940s-1970s, opened the participation of women in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
Colombia, and Peru. Under Che Guevara’s foco theory, small groups of armed guerrillas 
can spur a mass rebellion by accelerating the necessary conditions for the uprising 
through the armed struggle, and then emerge in rural areas with the support of the 
peasantry to win over a tyrannical regime.126 Considering that Guevara wrote his 
guerrilla strategy theory after the Cuban Revolution, it is questionable how much was a 
reflection after the events rather than a description of what happened. Walter Laqueur 
points out that Guevara’s view of how to conduct guerrilla warfare was in some aspects 
contrary to other revolutionary theories like Maoism and Marxism-Leninism. Che 
considered the armed struggle as the tool to convince the people to rise up rather than 
mobilizing the people around a political ideology. In the classical Maoist approach the 
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political ideology and will is more important than the armed struggle.127 Mao argued that 
a strong and loyal guerilla force were the product of political indoctrination. Furthermore, 
Mao argued that, “guerrilla leaders spend a great deal more time in organization, 
instruction, agitation, and propaganda work than they do fighting, for their most 
important job is to win over the people.”128 On the other hand, Marx-Leninist approach 
to insurrection saw the lack of control of a central organism and unorthodox nature of the 
guerrilla tactics as political liability in the post-conflict. Marx argued, “they [the 
guerrillas] must in times of peace, form the most dangerous mob.”129 Guevara tried to 
export the practice of foquismo guerrilla strategy against the Bolivarian military units 
supported by the US and died in the process in 1967. Foquismo worked in Cuba because 
of the freedom of movement and recruitment in the rural areas of Sierra Maestra, a 
culture of revolution in the ungoverned areas, weak government, propaganda, political 
repression, and the popular backlash against military violence against civilians.130 The 
conditions of regime repression against the insurgencies in Central America and South 
America diminished the utility of foco. For example, the Nicaraguan government’s 
repressive practices disrupted the initial years of the FSLN by eliminating leadership and 
countering attacks effectively. The FSLN quickly found that guerrilla fighting alone 
could not remove the regime, so they adapted to the circumstances and implemented 
guerrilla lessons learned from China and Vietnam. In 1967, the FSLN shifted to a more 
people’s war approach, which provided wider range of recruits and support that including 
women, peasants, works, Christian organizations, and discontent middle class 
organizations.131 These tactics and techniques spread to neighboring countries and the 
Andes region. 
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The Vietnam War influenced guerrilla popular notions of who could participate 
and how to execute an insurgency against the US influence. Ho Chi Minh’s victory in the 
Vietnam War not only cemented the idea that people’s war was a feasible endeavor, but 
also that U.S. support could be countered with information operations and propaganda. 
Additionally, Ho advocated for equal rights and participation of women, something 
insurgent organizations in Latin America incorporated in their recruitment strategy 
towards national liberation. Ho declared, “Women are half the people. If women are not 
free, then the people are not free.”132 This message not only resonated with women in 
Vietnam, but was also used by Communist and insurgent groups in Latin America, and 
much later reiterated by FET officers in Afghanistan, to bring attention to the importance 
of gender considerations in COIN. The framing of the struggle motivated women in 
Vietnam to fight for their country, and also motivated them to break with standard 
traditional roles and practices. In just over three years, women in the Northern Vietnam 
workforce grew to over 500,000.133 The call for participation of women pushed them to 
the front lines to perform numerous roles that included manning anti-aircraft guns, 
moving ammunition and supplies, spying, cooking, and road repair.134 Women in 
insurgencies like the FMLN, FSLN, URNG, EZLN, FARC, and SL benefited from the 
proven blue print produced by the women in the Vietnam War. The experience of women 
in Central America and the Andes Region insurgencies are closer to the Vietnamese than 
those who participated of the Cuban Revolution. In Cuba, women represented around five 
percent of the guerrilla fighters, and by Guevara’s own account, they were better suited 
for supporting roles than fighting.135 As discussed in the introduction, the majority of 
Latin American insurgencies since the Cuban Revolution have over 30 percent women 
who occupy positions from fighters to support.  
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J. Michael Waller makes a persuasive argument about shifts of tactics and 
strategies used by revolutionaries in Latin America in Post-Cuban Revolution. He argues 
that Vietnam lessons helped Central American revolutionaries in the area of non-military 
tactics. It was mobilization through the spread of internal support systems, rather than the 
transfer of Cuban methods, that was the primary influence.136 He uses the FMLN and on 
occasion, the FSLN case studies to argue that American activism helped expand networks 
of domestic and international support that eventually checked efforts of the U.S. 
Congress to become involved. Although this argument is unconvincing as Washington 
has been deeply involved in in checking the spread of revolution in Latin America, from 
the Alliance for Progress of the 1960s to Plan Colombia of 2000 The point is not that the 
activism directly swayed women to join the insurgency in Latin America, or impacted the 
outcome of the revolutions, but rather it highlighted an exchange of ideas relating to 
gender between activists and insurgents. During the time leading up to the insurgencies in 
Latin America, the feminist movements in the United States were expanding and winning 
significant battles regarding reproductive rights (Roe vs. Wade, 1973), education (Title 
IX of the Education Amendments), discrimination of gender (Executive Order 11375 
Affirmative Action policy expansion), and approval of the birth control pill (1960). The 
premise is that the Vietnam War and 1960s political activism somehow managed to 
influence, through contact and application of guerrilla tactics, the inclusion of women in 
larger numbers into their organizations. For example, in El Salvador the FMLN used 
women groups “to secure funds from development agencies eager to support women’s 
organizing.”137 The impact on mobilization, propaganda, intelligence collection, support, 
and as fighters increased the numbers and capacity of the rebels. The FSLN is the prime 
example of a movement that, after their initial setbacks, regrouped, and was able to build 
the kind of mobilization required to remove the military regime. The FSLN experience 
taught other insurgencies in the region that international networking and gaining support 
of the people was more sustainable than Guevara’s approach. 
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The mentioned shifts in strategy are important for the development of women in 
insurgency in Latin America. No longer is the destiny of the guerrilla in Latin America 
exclusively in the hands of bearded men fighting from the mountains. Rather, ownership 
of the revolution shifted to students, workers unions, peasants, international women 
organizations, and the even the support of church organizations to gain political goals and 
synchronize a popular movement strong enough to overthrow a regime or make 
substantial changes in the system. Since the mobilization of the masses included different 
levels of society and experience, the recruitment of savvy women in already structured 
organizations resulted as a perfect match. For example, in El Salvador, the FMLN used 
the Association of Salvadorian Women (ADEMUSA) as a hotbed for FMLN activities. A 
raid of the offices of the ADEMUSA, uncovered “eleven firebombs and stocks of 
gasoline, scores of steel tire-punctures used to make streets impassible, a Soviet-made 9-
millimeter pistol, and bomb-making materials.”138  
The shift of guerrilla tactics and interaction with external actors increased female 
participation in the groups. The outcome of the insurgencies varied in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador. The use of outside network support helped the Sandinistas in Nicaragua to 
topple the Somoza regime in 1979. However, in El Salvador it helped maintain a state of 
chaos that forced the government to negotiate political, educational, and social reform. 
The URNG pressure also led to a peace process and substantial political changes in 
Guatemala. The EZLN Internet campaign gathered massive international support that 
pressured the Mexican regime to grant some autonomy and investment in the Chiapas 
region. Women indigenous in Chiapas gained progress in the areas of education, 
women’s health, and economic independence through small business projects. The 
application of people’s war in Colombia also helped increase the number of women in the 
FARC-EP. On the other hand, the FARC-EP outreach to domestic and international 
women organizations failed to network effective means of support. Colombian 
information operations campaign targeting women to demobilize and anti-recruitment 
propaganda pushed the FARC-EP to establish Internet blogs, Facebook, and Websites 
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with limited success. The FARC-EP image of legitimacy has been tainted by their human 
rights abuses against women and drug financing methods.  
The SL also based its insurgency strategy on Mao’s popular war, which helped 
them open to the recruitment of people from all genders during the initial phases of the 
insurgency. However, they isolated themselves from the population by utilizing forced 
recruitment of entire communities and relying on weak hierarchal organization structure 
and utopian ideology. SL’s version of mass mobilization is not the same as that the rest of 
the insurgencies in this study. The Senderista’s recruitment of the people through 
propaganda and political indoctrination grew the support base, or masa, during the initial 
phases of the guerrilla. However, when pressured by security forces and scarce resources, 
it shifted to forcing entire communities into the organization coercion, and terror became 
the primary source of recruitment. After 1988, the conditions were so ruthless that 
“around 100 children and adults died for lack of food. The children, who did not have 
anything to eat, often ingested herbs and dirt that caused their deaths.”139  
Interestingly enough, Steven Stern found that when the SL forced their children 
into the insurgency, it was the women who first resisted the guerrillas.140 Stern argues 
that the women were the “ones who could most effectively wield the power normally 
exercised by the men.”141 The masa, composed of women and children, suffered greatly. 
The security forces rescued a community deep in guerrilla zone, and found “160 
Asháninkas and 40 colonos [indigenous tribes]. Among the group (80 percent were 
children and women), all were sick and malnourished, and 95 percent had tuberculosis, 
anemia, or gastrointestinal disorders.”142 The women within the SL co-opted men to 
demobilize.143 Stern concludes, “The family, as the most important web of social and 
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affective ties, managed to announce the end of the utopia—to break the grip of ‘total 
domination.’”144 
In summary, the shifts in mobilization tactics and strategies enabled women to 
participate willingly in some groups and unwillingly in others with great variations in 
commitment the outcome for the insurgencies. 
C. PERSONAL FACTORS 
Women often have a more substantial array of grievances to rebel against   
than men. 
—Kim Cragin and Sara Daly, 
Women as Terrorists: Mothers, Recruiters, and Martyrs, 2009 
 
Women also joined insurgencies for a diverse set of personal reasons that are not 
centered on ideology and shifts in insurgent strategy. In particular, many of them joined 
willingly or unwillingly because of three main reasons: domestic abuse, boredom and 
empowerment, and subsistence and security. All the insurgencies in Latin America 
were/are different in ideology, organization, social makeup, and goals. Therefore, 
generalizations about why women enlist in such dangerous endeavors are difficult to 
make. Nevertheless, there are factors that do affect women at the personal level and 
influence their choices more than that of men. Political organizations, environment, 
political opposition, and cultural factors mold each insurgency. The personal reasons 
discussed in the next section concentrate mostly on examples of the FARC-EP. The 
following section will address domestic abuse and the combination of perceived benefits 
as factors to pull and push women into the guerrilla force. 
1. Domestic Abuse 
In Colombia, domestic abuse is one of the most important factors for women and 
teens abandoning their communities and families to join the insurgency. In 1999, the 
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number of domestic abuse was 40,469 and 2,049 cases of rape.145 The Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor report on Colombia 2012 learned of 32,934 new 
investigations for domestic violence, although as usual these were most likely desperately 
under reported.146 In Colombia, violence against women is endemic and is a leading 
reason why young girls join insurgent ranks. More than 27 percent of the women that 
joined insurgent groups in Colombia were thirteen years or less of age147 (see Figure 1). 
The women in rural areas have higher percentage of mobilizing at a young age because of 
access to the guerrilla groups, and domestic abuse by family members. Additionally, 63 
percent of the rural women demobilized in Colombia mentioned domestic violence as a 
reason they seek protection inside the rebel organizations.148 Overall, 46 percent of the 
women claim that domestic violence was a motivation for joining the organization.149 
Reports highlight that in 65 percent of peasant sexual abuses the perpetrator was a family 
member.150 
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Figure 1.  Young girl in the FARC-EP.151 
In 2012, reporter Anne Phillips interviewed Athena [alias], a propaganda leader 
for the FARC, about her reasons for joining. She found that Athena fled home because of 
the abuse of the parents and continuous beatings by her brother. Once outside the home, 
she was offered protection, but was later handed over to the guerrillas. At the time that 
Athena joined the guerrillas, she was thirteen-years-old. She soon began training with 
weapons, political ideology, and performing nightly sexual duties in the camp. She was 
smart, attractive, and politically savvy. Her promotion to propaganda leader came 
because of her display of commitment and political utility to the unit. While acting as a 
propaganda leader, she felt empowered and accomplished her need to fill equal among 
the men in the organization. Later, she became pregnant and then disenfranchised with 
the group after a forced abortion. The most important finding of the interview was that 
the experience of the forced abortion increased Athena’s violent temper during combat, 
and her attitude towards danger. The abortion experience helped Athena’s decision to 
abandon the organization. She finally escaped and reintegrated into society through the 
government’s individual DDR program.152  
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The story of Athena is common among demobilized women in Colombia. In a 
study published in 2013 by Mauricio Rubio, nine percent of demobilized forces stated 
that coercion or trickery was the primary reason for joining the guerrillas.153 Guerrilla 
organizations target victims of domestic abuse through common acquaintances by 
offering protection. Based on statistics of demobilized guerrillas, 41 percent of FARC-EP 
women had their first contact with the guerrillas through a friend or family member.154 
The issue is more complex when men are the main providers in the household, where 
domestic abuse can extend to economic deprivation. In the aforementioned study, 20 
percent of women from rural areas and fully 38 from urban settings identified economic 
deprivation as the primary reason for joining the guerrillas. 
Natalia Herrera’s interviews of women in the FARC also found that domestic 
violence was a main contributor of women seeking protection and empowerment offered 
by the guerrillas. She argues that the physical abuse, combined with family 
fragmentation, creates an environment for women to abandon their household. 
Furthermore, she claims that the domestic environment and family relations are key to 
understanding personal motivations for joining the guerilla.155 
Mariana Díaz Kraus also found domestic abuse to be the number one reason that 
girls join armed groups like the FARC-EP or ELN. During her research girls claimed 
they thought that by joining the guerrillas, it would automatically give them the security 
and protection that they lacked at home.156 The following is part of Díaz interview with a 
girl that was given to the FARC-EP when she was 11 years old: 
I remember that my Mom got me up on Saturday morning very early, and 
packed three sets of clothing that I had. We went to the hills until we 
found a camp. When we arrived, she told me that she was leaving me there 
because she loved me and she did not even have for a sugar water, and that 
                                                
153 Rubio, “No Llores por Tania,” 35. 
154 Ibid., 33. 
155 Natalia Herrera, “Análisis de Entrevistas: Historia de Vida,” (Unpublished paper part of Master’s 
Thesis, University of the Andes, Social Sciences Faculty, Department of Political Science, Bogota, May 
2007), 2–4. 
156 Mariana Díaz Kraus, “Las Niñas de la Guerra: Motivos y Experiencias” (BA Monography, 
University of the Andes, Bogotá, Colombia, 2005), 14–15. 
 43 
there I was going to be better off. I cried a lot and begged her not to go, 
but a man took my hand and held me hard, and then she left. I never saw 
her again.157 
In summary, Colombia has a large population of women victims of domestic 
violence who are recruited, coerced, or tricked to joining the guerillas. To overcome the 
patriarchal barriers, women seek emancipation inside groups that offer equality of 
gender. However, they are confronted by a cruel reality when the issue of motherhood 
arises. Even Elda Neyis Mosquera, alias Karina, one of the most known women leaders 
in the FARC, spoke out about the abuses and suffering regarding motherhood. 
It is not complicated [being a women inside the FARC]; however, women 
suffer more, [because] women cannot have children over there, fortunately 
I was able to have my daughter because until 1993 abortion was not 
mandatory. Only after ’93 did abortion become mandatory.158 
Domestic abuse is one of the personal motivations to join. However, access to the 
guerrilla groups, boredom, the need for sexual partners for the men, and economic 
deprivation are contributing factors of the high rate of women in the FARC-EP. 
2. Perceived Benefits 
In this war, you don’t get involved because you want to, but because you 
have to. Because if you don’t, they kill you. Even though you didn’t know 
anything about the war.  
—Julia, demobilized FMLN guerrilla  
Insurgency organizations offer a chance for women and teenage girls to escape 
traditional roles, and for some excitement, in their otherwise powerless and boring life. 
The lack of resources and an unhealthy domestic environment push females to lose 
confidence in their communities, and seek to escape. This section discusses the following 
perceived benefits women consider when joining the guerilla forces: resources, 
protection, and monetary benefits. 
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Ingvild Magnaes Gjelsvik quoted an ex-guerrilla in Colombia alluding to the 
perceived benefits girls saw in the guerrilla: “I saw the women with them (the male 
soldiers) in the cars, with money . . . I became motivated and enthusiastic.”159 Herrera found 
some perceived cosmetic benefits, in that “how the guerrilla looked, why they were so 
pretty, they always were well groomed.”160 A girl’s contact with the guerrillas in their 
communities helped recruitment because the propaganda was constant and the guerrilla 
targeted women at will. For example, 50 percent of demobilized women in the rural areas 
claimed that were taught how to handle weapons by the guerrillas prior to joining the 
organization.161 Of course, this presupposes that these recruits came from areas 
dominated by the guerrillas, which in the 1990s were extensive, especially in Southern 
Colombia, where President Andrés Pastrana granted the FARC-EP a large despeje or 
“cleared zone” in the south as a precondition for negotiations. 
In a recent study of demobilized women in Colombia, 30 percent claimed 
economic deprivation as the primary reason for enlistment, 23 percent indicated a need 
for protection, while eight percent indicated a search for adventure or change. ; Only 
eight percent claimed ideological affinity with the insurgency.162 Rubio acknowledged 
that it is “difficult to understand how poverty pushes young people to join an organization 
that normally does not pay anything.”163 He further highlights that the main difference, 
based on his research of demobilized men and women, was that “men focus more on the 
economic reasons [for joining]; however, women [mention more reasons] related to 
power and protection.”164 For example, the number one reason that women from rural 
areas join, is for power and protection. On the other hand, approximately 38 percent of 
those demobilized from urban areas cite economic reasons for joining.165  
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Rubio does not attempt to explain these variations. One can posit that women 
from urban settings might feel more entitled to a higher standard of living and material 
things than women from impoverished rural areas. This is significant, because until 
recently, literature claimed that men and women joined insurgencies for the same 
reasons. Authorities can use the understanding of what motivates men and women, and 
focus on variations from rural and urban settings to create tactics and strategies to 
encourage female participation in community organizations and regional politics. The 
government can provide women with the opportunity to participate in community 
security forces and encourage education in the affected regions. Then the argument is that 
relative depravation theory could explain Rubio’s finding of poorer women from rural 
areas seems to care less about economic needs, than those that come from the urban 
setting. Similar to Kampwirth’s findings, women became radicalized due to migration 
patterns between rural and urban settings. Migration and refugee status from internal 
conflict developed a deep sense of inequality in Central American women, leading them 
to mobilize against a perceived injustice in larger numbers.166  
This combination of poverty, domestic violence, a sense of empowerment, and in 
some cases, experience as internally displaced persons (IDPs), can push women into 
viewing the guerrilla organizations as instrumental in fulfilling their needs, or at least the 
best option they have. According to the United Nations Higher Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), Colombia has one of the highest percentages of IDPs in the world 
(4.7 million), making it the largest in the Western Hemisphere.167 Estimates consider 
“women heading up to 56 percent of displaced households (NRC, 2002a), and their 
families are highly vulnerable.” 168 The Humanitarian Policy Group found that many of 
the IDPs fear asking for help from the authorities and suffer discrimination once they 
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reach an urban setting because are they are viewed guerrilla supporters.169 This 
population of women is by far the most susceptible to coercion and persuasion to join the 
guerrillas. 
D. FRAMING FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN MILITANCY 
Terrorism is a tactic used by some guerrilla groups. It is useful to explore the 
theoretical framework of terrorism to explain motivations of female participation in 
insurgencies and violence. This analysis will center on the case of women in the FARC.  
The United States considers the FARC-EP to be a terrorist organization, because 
of the numerous atrocities committed against the rural communities. The START 
database analyzed 954 incidents in which the FARC focused their attacks against non-
governmental individuals.170 Since 1982, terrorist organizations in Colombia have 
incorporated women in the fighting guerrilla forces.171 This section will define Martha 
Crenshaw’s instrumental and organizational approaches to terrorism and apply them 
against the case of women terrorists in Colombia. Several empirical observations emerge 
from this analysis. First, the tangible and intangible benefits serve as motivation for 
women to join the FARC-EP. Second, the Colombian repression encouraged recruitment 
of women into the terrorist organization, especially in FARC-governed territories. Third, 
competition between genders was associated with the increase in brutality within the 
organization. 
Martha Crenshaw categorizes terrorist organizations’ decisions as rational 
activities in two ways: instrumental and organizational. The first one explains terrorist 
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activities based on the cost and benefits analysis of a politically motivated actor.172 In her 
view, this approach to terrorism is rational and “represents a strategic choice.”173 
Terrorist organization actions are justified by their political views, and events are 
triggered because of “the perception of incentive and opportunity.”174 For instance, Tanja 
Nijmeijer, the Dutch woman who famously enlisted in the FARC-EP, stated that, “I chose 
to do politics in a country where doing politics implies violence.”175 Her explanation 
suggests that violence is a rational choice for the FARC-EP. Tanja’s reasoning for joining 
and participating in the kidnapping of American citizens and bombing of innocent 
civilians, follows Crenshaw’s instrumental approach in which “terrorism is a means to a 
political end.”176 Tanja’s defense for the FARC’s terrorizing of hundreds of peasants is 
known as “‘cognitive restructuring,’ through which reprehensible conduct is presented as 
honorable.”177 Tanja’s version of attacks promotes a view of the violence that becomes 
acceptable to women who seek political change. This legitimization of violence against 
civilian targets provides other women sitting on the fence with an excuse to sympathize 
or even join the effort of militants in actions to which they would otherwise be opposed. 
For example, Isabel, a young Colombian university student, convinced that her 
revolutionary ideals required her to take violent actions against the government and 
sympathizers, joined the FARC-EP.178  
Crenshaw’s second approach, called Organizational Process Theory, explains 
terrorism on the basis of organizational survivability, and “internal group dynamics.”179 
This approach considers individual ambitions, frustrations, and internal disagreements to 
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explain collective violent actions, as well as political fragmentation.180 Crenshaw’s 
organizational model posits that terrorist organizations can survive without successful 
political expectations if they can provide incentives that appeal to their supporters and 
combatants.181 Many women from rural and urban areas of Colombia felt deep 
grievances and lack of options to channel their aspirations of education, jobs, and health 
care. The average unemployment rate of females in Colombia was 15.41 percent between 
1980 and 2010.182 In Colombia, the FARC replaced the legitimacy of the government by 
providing governance in areas they controlled, as well as providing security to peasants 
and middle-class women against paramilitary forces. They also gave peasants access to 
better food and weapons, and, more importantly, gave females a sense of empowerment 
and an opportunity to break away from standard gender roles.183 Women excelled in the 
FARC in areas of intelligence, propaganda, popular outreach, and recruitment of other 
females.184 Crenshaw argues that “incentives for joining a terrorist organization . . . 
includes a variety of individual needs: to belong to a group, to acquire social status and 
reputation, to find comradeship or excitement, or to gain material benefits.”185 Other 
factors that increased female recruits in the FARC were family ties, revenge, custom, a 
sense of adventure, and improvement of living conditions.186 In the FARC, some women 
initially found all those aforementioned needs. For example, Isabel considered that she 
found a new family during the first three months of her military indoctrination.187  
The FARC-EP filled communities with propaganda, spreading a message of 
gender equality and empowerment of women.188 In rural areas, peasants were lured into 
the insurgency because of links to youth political groups, family, lack of opportunity, and 
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indoctrination. However, even middle-class females were also vulnerable to recruitment 
through education. For example, Lillian Lopez Alias Olga Lucia Marin, commander of 
the FARC, found communism appealing at the Juan Ramon Jimenez College when she 
migrated from the Colombian interior city of Armenia to the urban Bogotá.189 
Radicalization of migrant women between rural and urban environments was also present 
in other groups throughout the Latin American region.190 Some women saw the disparity 
of urban versus rural life, which built up resentment and even anger against the existing 
social and political order. They came to see their perceived oppression as the product of 
the capitalist economic system.  
Young women’s opportunities, already limited, were further undermined by 
domestic abuse and state violence against the guerrilla and civilians. By 2000, females 
surged to an average of 30 percent of FARC-EP fighters.191 These changes in gender 
composition inside the organization helped prevent exit and discontent among the most 
isolated men fighting in the rural areas. Some experts explain that the inclusion of women 
led to high levels of male recruitment, arguing that, “FARC’s success and survivability 
was centered on the sexual services provided by female guerrillas.”192  
Demobilized women in militant groups in Colombia commented that they entered 
into a non-stated gender struggle with their male comrades,193 which made them more 
aggressive during attacks to prove the worth of females in the field.194 “The courage and 
efficiency of female fighters—not to mention ferocity—set the gold standard of audacity 
under fire.”195 This gender competition can lead to an increase in violence and brutality 
of the terrorist attacks. Some observed that, “a woman is more dangerous than a man . . . 
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many women in male-dominated organizations feel that they must out-perform men to be 
taken seriously.”196 
In conclusion, Crenshaw’s explanatory framework of terrorism – the instrumental 
and organizational approaches—can help to understand the rationality of why women 
join and remain in the FARC-EP. The benefits of women joining the FARC-EP outweigh 
the otherwise dreary, insecure, and often brutal peasant life. The instrumental approach 
explains the rationality of women who accepted violence as the only way to achieve 
political change. The organizational approach explains why women join for the benefits 
acquired. Once inside the organization, the gender competition increased their ferocity 
within the organization, which is explained by the idea of a competitive environment 
proposed by Crenshaw’s organizational approach. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Cuban revolution reinforced and empowered other groups in Latin American 
with training and equipment. However, internal factors rather than Cuban contamination 
explain the emergence and spread of insurgencies in Latin America from the 1950s. 
Marxist-Leninism and liberation theology are two ideological currents that lured men and 
women into organizations to fight against the regime. These ideologies shifted the 
strategic thinking of the male leaders of the organizations, which caused them to see the 
utility of female participation in revolutionary groups. The emergence of Communist 
organizations and Marxist-Leninist ideological insurgencies appealed to women, because 
of the hope that regime change would improve their lives.  
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IV. FEMALE ROLES IN INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will cover roles of females in insurgencies in Latin America. The 
goal is to understand the positions of females in different groups and outline factors that 
contribute to variations in the number of females in leadership. The first part of the 
analysis will focus on the experiences of Tanja Nijmeijer (FARC-EP), Haydée Tamara 
Bunke Bider (Tania the Guerrilla or Tania la Guerrillera in Spanish), Karina (FARC-
EP), Nidia Díaz (Maria) (FMLN), and Augusta La Torre (SL). Women participate in 
insurgencies as sympathizers, spies, warriors, and dominant ideological forces. However, 
the factors that determine the transition of roles are political militancy, leadership and 
communication skills, physical appearance, personal preference, and family ties (see 
Figure 2). The last section of this chapter will focus on the influence that advancements 
in technology have on female roles and agenda inside the insurgencies. 
 
Figure 2.  Main female role types 
B. UNLIKELY GUERRILLAS 
Tanja (alias Alexandra) Nijmeijer is one of the most recognized female guerrilla 
fighters in Latin America and from the FARC-EP. Before Tanja, Haydée Tamara Bunke 
Bider, alias Tania the Guerrillera (Tania the Guerrilla), was the most recognized female 
 52 
insurgent on the western hemisphere. Tania la Guerrillera was fatally shot in 1967, while 
aiding Che Guevara in a failed revolution in the Bolivian jungle. Tanja and Haydée’s 
participation in the revolutionary movements share similarities, although their 
participation and roles vary.  
1. Tania La Guerrillera—International Spy and Guerrilla 
Haydée Tamara Bunke Bider, better known as Tania La Guerrillera, fought 
Bolivian troops in the jungle until her death. Like Tanja, Haydée had a deep commitment 
to the revolutionary struggle. Haydée was born in Argentina in 1937, the daughter of two 
communist exiles from Germany, Erich, and Nadia Bunke. Her family returned to 
Germany, where she studied, and at the age of 14, joined the Free German Youth (FGY). 
She learned several languages and played guitar. Like Tanja, Haydée started working in 
grass-roots organizations, and translating as part of her political duties. She felt great 
admiration for the Cuban revolution, getting involved in several political activities in 
Cuba. Haydée found inspiration in the prospect of revolution, in other parts in Latin 
America. While in Cuba, she trained in military affairs, but never saw any real combat. 
Che Guevara himself recommended Haydée from a short list of smart women for a secret 
mission to overthrow of the government of Bolivia.197 She accepted the assignment and 
began training. Her selection occurred because of her linguistic skills, sense of culture, 
intelligence, and commitment to the cause.198 Figure 3 displays pictures of the different 
identities that Haydée used in her role as a spy, after training throughout Cuba, Europe, 
and Bolivia. 
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Figure 3.  Haydée Tamara Bunke Bider multiple identities.199  
In a meeting with Che Guevara, Haydée confirmed her commitment by stating, “I 
will never betray this trust while I am still alive and breathing.”200 With those words, 
Haydée sealed her role as the spy who would organize an urban network to support Che’s 
urban revolution. Later, she was told by her handlers that her primary mission was to 
develop an urban cell to support the armed revolutionary groups.201 After a yearlong 
training process on communication equipment, clandestine messaging, escape and 
evasion, and military weapons training, she was ready for Bolivia.202 Haydée traveled to 
Europe, and later in 1964, arrived at La Paz, Bolivia as Laura Gutiérrez Bauer. She 
quickly started making contacts, and even casually met the Bolivian dictator, General 
René Barrientos.203  
In 1966, Haydée met with Che in Bolivia, and in 1967, incorporated completely 
into the rural guerrilla.204 Che Guevara and other Cuban insurgents tried unsuccessfully 
to gather popular support among the peasantry, and soon were located by U.S. trained 
security forces. In August 1967, the Bolivian Army ambushed Haydée and a group of 13 
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guerrillas trying to cross a river. The ambush killed Haydée and twelve of the other, 
leaving only one survivor.205 Her body remained in Bolivia until 1998, when it was 
transferred to Cuba. The Castro Government named her a national hero of the 
revolutionary movement, commemorating coins and postal stamps in her honor (see 
Figure 4 and 5). 
 
Figure 4.  Cuban One Peso in honor of Tania La Guerrillera (Haydée Bunke)206 
 
Figure 5.  Tamara Bunke fifth anniversary of the Day of the Guerrilla Stamp207  
                                                
205 Ibid. 
206 Cuban Tania La Guerrillera Commemorative One Peso Coin 1988, 
http://www.todocoleccion.net/moneda-medalla-cuba-tania-guerrillera-10-pesos-calidad-proof-1-onza-plata-
perfecta~x19162399. 
207 Juan Hernández Machado, “La Mujer Enaltece la Filatelia Cubana (II),” Filatelia desde Cuba, 
March 8, 2013, http://filateliadesdecuba.wordpress.com/2013/03/08/la-mujer-enaltece-la-filatelia-cubana-
ii/. 
 55 
2. Tanja Nijmeijer from Fighter to Peace Negotiator 
Tanja and Haydée were two females who grew up in strong households with 
parents who participated actively in their education. They both were well educated, 
traveled, spoke various languages, played guitar, and developed a deep revolutionary 
conviction to fight against the established regimes in Latin America. Tanja grew up in the 
town of Denekamp in the Netherlands, where her dad worked as a construction 
technician, and her mother as a store manager.208 She attended college at the University 
of Groningen. In 1999, she traveled to Colombia as an exchange student, where she 
worked for one year as an English teacher in the city of Pereira. Tanja’s radicalization 
occurred while researching the causes of the FARC’s struggle, and traveling across 
diverse sectors of Colombia. She left her exchange student experience as a different 
person. Jorge Enrique Botero, Tanja’s biographer, recalled her saying that during her 
initial stay in Colombia, she was bitten by the “fever of the revolution.”209 She returned 
to Colombia in 2002, and participated in clandestine and grass roots movements, 
including a demonstration called March for Life to benefit Northern area peasants.210 She 
then started working with the urban segment of the FARC-EP, and participated in the 
bombing of police stations and bus networks in the city of Bogotá.211  
In an interview in February 2013, Tanja stated that she became concerned with 
the great inequality and suffering of the peasants. During the same interview, she 
compared the right to take arms against the Colombian government as equal to the allied 
forces bombings against fascist forces during World War II.212 In an interview for The 
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Voice of Russia American Edition in 2014, she narrated how the transformation occurred, 
and described the different roles in which she participated inside the FARC-EP. 
Following are her answers to questions of how she joined the guerrilla. 
It was a very gradual process. First, I thought, “I am going to work with 
grassroots movements in Colombia, or with union leaders.” Then I started 
to realize that all those people who fight for another Colombia, for a new 
Colombia, who have other ideas than the government are being threatened, 
are being put in jail, are being killed. That’s an everyday question. So 
when I discovered that, I went back to Holland first, then I came back, but 
finally I decided to join the guerrilla force.213 
Well first, I started to work, do little stuff, like write things for the 
guerrilla, and then I got more and more involved. I started to work in 
Bogotá, I moved to Bogotá . . . then I started to work in the militia. The 
militia in Colombia is like, it’s not guerrilla, they live in cities mostly but 
also in the countryside, and they just work with the guerrilla force. So I 
started to work as a militia in Bogotá. And after some while, after some 
six months, they [asked] if I wanted to go to the jungle for a while. And I 
was like, why not? I could try it. I mean, I wasn’t thinking about joining 
the guerrilla force or staying in the jungle or something like that. It was 
just like, I’m going to do a course for some three or six months, and then 
I’ll see what I’ll do. And then, when I arrived at the jungle, I saw all those 
guerrilla people, and I saw the education that was given to them, and I saw 
how they were living, and I heard their stories about their lives. I saw how 
daily life in the guerrilla is. So, after some two months, I decided to 
stay.214 
Tanja’s education level enabled her to transition from writing propaganda and 
other clandestine work, to becoming a full-time guerrilla. Currently, she is part of the 
negotiating delegation of the FARC-EP in Cuba, where the Colombian government hopes 
to put an end to the guerrilla insurgency. In 2003, an ex-demobilized FARC-EP 
commander stated that, “Tanja represents an efficient propagandistic instrument that will 
allow the FARC to clean their international image . . . [that] is something that has been in 
the works for over a year, time which Tanja used to prepare.”215 He added that her 
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astronomical rise to the top levels of the FARC-EP, and even a seat at the negotiation 
table, were because of “her [Tanja’s] knowledge of English, nationality, sometimes 
innate analytical ability, and on other occasions, her sexual chicanery.”216 
During a raid in 2007, security forces found emails on a computer belonging to 
Victor Julio Suárez, alias Mono Jojoy, in which Carlos Antonio Lozada “highlights the 
qualities and capacities the foreigner [Tanja] had to become part of the International 
Commission.”217 Tanja’s standing inside the FARC-EP was not always as good. During 
the same raid in 2007, Tanja’s diary turned up in a search of the bombed camp of Mono 
Jojoy. Under the code name Eillen, Tanja wrote strong criticisms of the commanders, and 
questioned their reasons for fighting. 
I'm tired, tired of Farc, tired of the people, tired of communal life. Tired of 
never having anything for myself. It would be worth it if we knew why we 
were fighting. But the truth is I don't believe in this any more . . . I don't 
know where this project is going. How will it be when we come to power? 
The girlfriends of the commanders in Ferrari Testarossas, with breast 
implants, and eating caviar?218 
Several authors have translated her diary and outline the major points. 
She writes that the FARC is a jail, a garbage dump… where some have 
Rolexes and others are treated like animals (like she) and the private life 
of the guerrilla. She says that in the middle of the solitude of the jungle, 
the FARC guerrilla members have sex all day long, to the point of getting 
AIDS, in other words . . . to fuck, kill, and fuck because this world is 
coming to an end!219 
Because of her diary, Jorge Botero wrote that the higher command of the FARC 
considered executing her.220 Tanja performed many roles in the years of participation in 
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the FARC-EP. Tanja worked in the support roles as a writer, English translator, and a 
teacher. She also worked as a warrior in the rank and file in the front lines, and fought 
next to senior leaders like Mono Jojoy. She currently has warrants for her arrest for 
bombings in Bogotá, and for her participation in the kidnapping of three Americans.221 
The most recent role as negotiator in Cuba keeps her busy with public relations, press 
releases, and interviews with the international and Colombian press. The Colombian 
press is of the opinion that La Holandesa’s (Dutch Woman) is far from the typical 
guerrilla woman, whom she claims to represent. 
As discussed in Chapter III, many young girls and teens joined the FARC-EP 
because of social, economic, and personal conditions. Many of the typical guerrillas grew 
in unstable households, dropped out of schools, had a life full of boredom, and lacked the 
opportunity to learn to read and write. Once these girls were inside the organization with 
promised equality and opportunity, they found that upper mobility and opportunity is still 
based on discriminatory and arbitrary conditions. If this is true, then what other factors 
allowed women like Tanja to attain upper mobility in the organization?  
Research by Mariana Díaz Kraus found that, “differences regarding the hierarchy 
among the girls, particularly based on physical features of youngsters, contributed to 
them establishing relationships with the commanders and receiving benefits, for example, 
in labor assignments.”222 On the other hand, Herrera notes that the “women share the 
same rights, tasks, and responsibilities as men; therefore, the upper mobility inside the 
organizational structure can be attributed to commitment, capacity, and good conduct 
inside the group.”223 In the case of Tanja, her upper mobility can be attributed to 
language skills, commitment to the political cause, intelligence, and close relationship 
with other guerrilla leaders. Below are some pictures of Tanja Nijmeijer in the fields of 
Colombia and in Cuba. 
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Figure 6.  Tanja Nijmeijer and her mother, Hannie, at FARC-EP camp. 224 
 
Figure 7.  Tanja Nijmeijer (right) at a FARC-EP guerrilla camp.225 
 
Figure 8.  Tanja Nijmeijer reading a press release to reporters about FARC-EP and 
Colombian government negotiations in Cuba 2012.226 
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Both Tanja and Tania’s middle-class childhoods in Europe, access to higher 
education, language skills, and international travel, made them unlikely recruits for 
revolutionary insurgencies in Latin America. For instance, women in modern 
insurgencies in Colombia live surrounded by domestic and state violence, are often less 
educated than their urban counterparts, and lack other opportunities for upper mobility.227 
Both guerrilla icons gave up prosperous lives – Tania the life of a translator and political 
advocate and Tanja the one of an educator, for a life of armed revolution.  
Many women joined the insurgencies because of social economic and protection 
issues. However, Tanja and Tania participated because of deep ideological convictions 
and probably a sense of guilt and an infatuation with a romanticized image of guerrilla 
life. Tania served as spy, guerrilla warrior, clandestine group organizer, radio and written 
communicator, and translator. Tanja’s participation in the insurgency included guerrilla 
warrior, writer, translator, arsonist, clandestine group organizer, strategic communicator, 
and more recently, negotiator. The combination of personal skills helped them to advance 
within the ranks of the organizations. The differences that Tania and Tanja have with the 
other rank and file guerrilla fighters are exactly why they were so valuable to insurgent 
organizations. Based on the experience of Tania and Tanja, upward mobility within their 
respective insurgent organizations occurred because of their language skills, physical 
appearance, international education, sexual attributes, and more importantly, a 
commitment to the revolutionary cause. Above all, each was seen as projecting a positive 
international image for their guerrilla organizations. The next case study of Elda Neyis 
Mosquera, alias Karina, offers another perspective from that of Tania, and Tanja. 
C. KARINA FROM GUERRILLA LEADER TO PEACE PROMOTER 
Elda Neyis Mosquera Garcia, also known as Karina, recalled the day she almost 
lost her life: “I was going to hell . . . It was horrible, but I know that is where I was 
going.”228 During a battle with security forces, Karina suffered a dislocated jaw, 
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permanent damaged to an eye, and multiple scars on her body.229 Unlike Tania or Tanja, 
Karina did not study abroad, learn to play instruments, or even finish high school. Nor is 
she physically attractive, another avenue of preferment for females in the FARC. 
Furthermore, she is Afro-Colombian, a disadvantaged group in Colombia. Nevertheless, 
over her 24-year career in the FARC, she rose to become the leader of a FARC front, a 
position rarely held by women.230 The case of Karina underlines that the following 
factors are critical for upper mobility inside the organization: seniority, commitment to 
the organization (not necessarily ideology), discipline and, above all in her case, 
ruthlessness. 
She is one of the most brutal ex-guerrilla leaders of the FARC-EP. According to 
David Baracaldo Orjuela who interviewed her, Karina grew up with her grandmother—
who mistreated her—in a poor area of Colombia called Currulao. She balanced primary 
school and domestic duties by selling fruits and arepas (a maize based flatbread popular 
in Colombia and Venezuela) between classes. During that time, the guerrillas appeared in 
her neighborhood with Marxist and Communist propaganda. Karina’s family pulled her 
out of school, so that enlisting in the guerrillas became an option to break away from the 
boredom and abuse.231  
Elda recalls her Dad’s reasoning for not letting her continue her studies: 
My dad said in his brutality that human beings did not need to study, let 
alone raise children and have a husband. Also in the case of a man, did not 
need to learn anything more than to work the land.232 
Orjuela reported how Karina became involved with the organization from a very 
early age. At the age of 15, she joined the Communist Youth party of Colombia (JUCO), 
an antechamber to the FARC. In 1984, a female FARC-EP member recruited Karina by 
simply asking her if she wanted to join. During her initial months in the guerrilla, she 
learned quickly that loyalty was something valued in the FARC-EP. She recalled that one 
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of the initial tests was to kill a male friend accused of being a spy for the government 
security forces, with only a machete. She killed him without hesitation.233 Katina’s 
experience is similar to another ex-guerrilla interviewed by Mariana Díaz Kraus: 
I happened to kill a friend who was caught trying to defect to save her 
baby, she did not want an abortion. In the war council, I voted not to kill 
her, but my vote did not win. For that reason it was my responsibility to 
shoot [her], just for trying to help.234 
In 2008, Ricardo Ospina interviewed Miguel Paz, who was a former victim of 
Karina’s violence. According to Miguel’s Paz account, Karina’s unit stopped a bus near 
Caucheras in 2000. After pulling the passengers off the bus, they searched them and took 
some of the males as hostages. As an agribusiness developer specialist, Miguel Paz 
refused to comply and follow the guerrilla men into the woods. According to Miguel, 
Karina, the guerilla leader, “cut my penis and testicles off with a machete.”235 Miguel 
added that Karina also hit his wife during the event. Miguel’s wife recalled that over 60 
minors participated in the incident.236  
Karina’s role as the leader of the 47 Front Block of the FARC-EP ended in 2008 
when she surrendered to authorities, following intense pressure from security forces who 
had prioritized her kill or capture, and because she feared other guerrillas would sell her 
out to collect the significant bounty offered for her capture.237 Figure 9 displays a photo 
of Karina’s surrender in 2008. 
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Figure 9.  Elda Neyis Mosquera Garcia surrenders in 2008.238 
After her surrender, she traveled Colombia as part of a campaign against the 
FARC-EP, and encouraged other women to abandon the militant groups. The government 
sent her to prison, and used her as a Gestor de Paz (Peace Promoter) during a campaign 
to bring peace between victims and perpetrators.239 This is a far cry from what she once 
claimed, “in the guerrilla, there is a saying: those who cannot kill, serve to be killed.”240 
The image of Karina changed dramatically from a savage guerrilla leader to a repentant 
and outspoken critic of the war against the government. Figure 10 displays Elda 
campaigning for peace. 
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Figure 10.  Elda Neyis Mosquera Garcia as a peace promoter.241 
In summation, Karina was a sympathizer for the Communist party during her 
childhood. Later, during her teens, she joined the FARC-EP as a guerrilla fighter. During 
her 24 years as a guerrilla, she moved from the rank and file level to leader of a unit of 
300 fighters.242 In contrast to Tanja and Tania, Karina’s advancement within the 
organization was done through years of fighting experience, toughness, and violence. 
Karina’s example is not an isolated case in the FARC-EP. While still Minister of Defense 
current President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos, said that Karina “was a woman who 
rose in the ranks because of her audacity and cruelty.”243 Other intelligence sources 
claimed, “to become a FARC leader you have to been utterly ruthless and vicious even 
more so if you are a women . . . Karina was both.”244 While some guerrilla fighters like 
Karina ruled with an iron fist, others like Nidia Díaz, were able to use political skills and 
intelligence to advance in the FMLN. 
María Marta Valladares was known in the FMLN insurgent group as Nidia Díaz. 
She held several roles in the FMLN including that of guerrilla commander. Unlike the 
FARC-EP which is controlled by a central Secretariat, the FMLN was an organization 
composed of several groups, which included the National Resistance (RN), the 
Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC), the Popular Revolutionary 
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Army (ERP), the Popular Liberation Front (FPL), and the Salvadorian Communist Party 
(PCS). Nidia served in the ERP, and later in the PRTC. She became radicalized through 
her literacy work in church organizations affiliated with liberation theology called the 
Catholic Association of University Students (ACEU). She soon distinguished herself 
during the student movement, and later was recruited by the armed groups. During the 
initial stages of the insurgency, Nidia remained active in the urban clandestine groups, 
where she made contacts and gained experience.245 
According to Tracy Phillips, Nidia’s role in the student movement gave her 
leadership skills and a reputation sought after by leaders of the rebel groups. Because of 
her commitment and knowledge, she joined the Political Affairs Coordinating body of the 
ERP in 1973. In 1975, she was part of the group of rebels that formed the PRTC, where 
she performed roles of logistician, guerrilla cell leader, political strategist, and 
coordinator of large-scale military plans. The effectiveness of her logistical work landed 
her a seat on the PRTC leadership board, and later she became one of the negotiators 
during the peace process.246 Figure 10 displays Maria Marta Valladares with other 
members of FMLN negotiators. 
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Figure 11.  Nidia Díaz during the Peace Agreement dialogs. 247 
Although Nidia climbed rapidly to a leadership position, she claimed that to have 
upward mobility in the organization, one had to have combat experience.248 Leadership 
inside the organization was not easy for her because of patriarchal attitudes towards 
female leadership. For instance, she stated, “I always gave the urban front war reports 
using men’s names because I didn’t want it detected that one of its principle chiefs was a 
woman.”249 Philips claimed “Her willingness to defend the principals of the struggle and 
pay the social cost of participation gained her respect and recognition.”250 Philips also 
claimed that the appeal for Nidia in the organizations was because “she was able to 
communicate with everyone.”251 One can conclude that the rebel organization recruited 
Nidia because of her political skills and proven track record in other progressive 
networks. This recruitment path influenced the way she experienced the war and capacity 
to advance within the organization. In summary, the case of Maria Marta Valladares 
(Nidia) highlights two important factors that determine upper mobility of women in the 
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insurgencies: preexisting networks and political skills. She is the current FMLN 
International Relations Secretary of El Salvador. Figure 11 displays a recent photo of 
Maria Marta Valladares. 
 
Figure 12.  Maria Marta Valladares as the FMLN International Relations 
Secretary.252 
D. AUGUSTA, ELENA, AND LORI IN PERU INSURGENCIES 
The following case study shows women in the role of ideological leaders. 
Augusta La Torre, alias Comrade Norah, was part of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or 
SL) from 1980 until her death in 1988. Her husband, Abimael Guzmán, became the 
intellectual and supreme leader of Shining Path. Augusta, Abimael, and later Elena 
Iparraguirre, constituted the intellectual and operational leadership of the organization. 
The case of Augusta confirms that personal relations are important for upper mobility and 
influences the role of women and their experience in the insurgent organization. Figure 
12 displays of a photo of Augusta.  
                                                




Figure 13.  Augusta La Torre alias Comrade Norah.253  
According to investigative reporter Miguel Gutiérrez, Augusta La Torre was born 
in Huanta, Peru, in 1946 into a lower middle class family. Guzmán and Augusta’s dad 
struck up a friendship, which led Augusta to meet him and fall in love. They married in 
1964. Guzmán created the Popular Woman’s Movement (MCP) and named Augusta as 
their leader. The MCP served as a recruiting and propaganda organization for women into 
SL. She traveled to China with Abimael, where they studied Mao’s guerrilla strategy. 
Guitiérrez report highlights that Guzmán together with Augusta and Elena Iparraguirre 
led and planned SL operations, including the one massacre of 67 civilians in 1983.254 The 
revolution against the government soon turned into cruel struggle to control the peasants 
as a source of resources and manpower, which produced an estimated 70,000 deaths, 
most of them peasants.255 Figure 14 displays a photo of Augusta, and Figure15 displays 
her funeral with Elena Iparraguirre and her husband, Abimael Guzmán in 1989.  
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Figure 14.  Augusta La Torre alias Comrade Norah Second in Command of Sendero 
Luminoso Terrorist Organization.256 
 
Figure 15.  Elena Iparraguirre and Abimael next to August’s dead body in 1989.257 
On January 20, 2014, Abimael Guzmán and Elena Iparraguirre, among other 
people, were charged of the notorious bombings in the Tarata Street in residential area of 
Miraflores in Lima, Peru. The terrorist attack consisted of a coordinated explosion of two 
car bombs in 1992, which killed 25, and injured 150 people. The government of Peru 
accused 11 members of the SL, five of which were women. This bombing marked a 
significant event in the newly elected Alberto Fujimori presidency, which then realized 
that the terrorist organization operations were operating in the capital, rather than only in 
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isolated areas in rural Peru. The incident led to an aggressive reaction by the security 
forces and public to fight back against the SL forces and support groups.258 Figure 16 
highlights the number of victims per president of Peru since 1980. 
 
Figure 16.  Map location and graphic of SL victims since 1980.259 
The participation of women like August and Elena in terrorists groups in Peru, 
was not an isolated incident or exclusive to the Shining Path. In 1995, security forces 
from Peru arrested an American born, 26-year-old Lori Berenson for aiding the terrorist 
group Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). Like other foreign, middle class 
females who rallied to insurgent groups, Berenson was attracted to the cause of Latin 
American equality while a student at MIT. The MRTA was a terrorist organization that 
plotted to overthrow the Peruvian Government by armed struggle. She was in Peru on a 
journalist assignment and was later detained with the wife MRTA leader Nestor Cerpa. 
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They accused Berenson of treason and aiding the MRTA plan during an attack on the 
Peruvian Congress. Prior to her arrest, Lori Berenson visited the Congressional Palace, 
where her photographer, the wife of the M.T.R.A leader, took pictures as she drew notes 
of the seating arrangement of the congress members. When in 1995 the security forces 
raided the house where she had stayed, MRTA members who occupied it fought for over 
ten hours killing one police officer. Inside the house, police discovered the plans to attack 
the legislative body, MRTA fighters, and weapons cache. 260 The raid also captured the 
second in command of M.R.T.A., Miguel Rincon. At the time of her capture, Berenson 
had lived in Peru for a year. She claimed to have sublet rooms in the house in Lima to 
M.R.T.A. members in Lima; however, that the fact that she had been unaware of their 
activities, the presence of arms, or that the woman she had hired to take photographs of 
the Peruvian congress was an M.R.T.A. member, are claims that the court refused to 
believe.261 
In January 1996, Berenson went in front of the Peruvian Press and shouted in 
Spanish, “In the M.R.T.A. there are no criminal terrorists. It is a revolutionary 
movement!”262 Figure 17 displays Lori shouting in front of news reporters in 1996. She 
was sentenced to 20 years of prison and was released after 15 years on parole.263 Her 
dramatic story has captivated the Peruvian and international press since her apprehension. 
While she was in prison, Lori married a convicted M.R.T.A. terrorist. Lori still lives in 
Peru with toddler son named Salvador, awaiting the end of her sentence in 2015.264 
Figure 18 displays photos from the New York Times report about Lori and her son in 
Peru in 2011. 
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Figure 17.  Lori Berenson 1996 defiant in front of Peruvian Press.265 
 
Figure 18.  Lori and son in Salvador in 2011.266 
In summary, the participation of women in insurgencies is common and range 
from ideological leaders to supporting roles in Peru. Augusta La Torre’s role (alias 
Comrade Norah) in insurgency shifted from supporter to ideological leader because of 
her relationship with the insurgent leader Abimael Guzmán. The case of Augusta and 
Elena inside the SL leadership is rare and not consistent with other insurgencies in Latin 
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America in which the majority of the ideological leaders were men. The increase in the 
number of women participants in the leadership positions, and as members within the SL, 
is representative of the university environment where the SL built its base. The role of 
Augusta as the leader of MCP bolstered the role of women in the SL because it combined 
two powerful factors consistent with the mobilization of women: first, preexisting 
networks, which helped recruitment; second ideology, which targeted a disenfranchised 
minority (women) in a patriarchal society. 
The lack of information about Augusta’s guerrilla fighting experience suggests 
that not all women in leadership need combat experience to reach leadership positions, as 
suggested by Nidia Díaz’s experience with the insurgent organization. One could argue 
that Lori Berenson and Augusta had personal relationships with members of their 
respective terrorist organizations, which led them to experience and participate in diverse 
roles that otherwise would have been different. Female participation in insurgencies as 
highlighted in the diverse set of cases varied depending upon the way they were recruited 
and their aspirations. Women continued to find ways to support, and in some cases lead, 
as the insurgencies evolved with technology and communication strategies. The 
following section focuses on how evolution in communication technology influenced the 
female narratives and roles in insurgencies. 
E. GENDER AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 
In 1994, Chiapas—the southernmost state of Mexico—experienced an insurgency 
carried out by the EZLN.267 While the outbreak of yet another insurgency in Latin 
America was hardly headline news, the way the EZLN used their strategic 
communications struck students of revolution as innovative. The attention that the EZLN 
was able to draw from the international community took the Mexican government by 
surprise. This section will address the question of how advances in communication 
technology helped guerrillas overcome military weakness, in particular by enlisting 
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women. The main argument is that modern communications opens a new role for women 
to participate more actively in the insurgencies strategic messaging and recruitment; 
however, the success of their efforts depends upon the public perception of the 
insurgency. It is important to highlight that the FARC-EP has a negative image of sexual 
slavery, coercion, forced abortion, and exploitation of women that goes back 50 years, so 
the current effort to feminize the guerrilla actions, through the use of, technology is very 
difficult. On the other hand, Chiapas insurgency used gender as a key point of discussion 
in their initial messaging, which made the task to feminize the guerrilla issues more 
effective. 
The case of Chiapas illustrated how information technology can multiply the 
effects of strategic communication by changing the perception of non-state actors, both in 
indigenous and international audience. In particular, information technology 
revolutionizes gender participation in two ways: first, information technology (IT) allows 
insurgent groups to incorporate female emancipation messages into the revolutionary 
strategic communications, with a persistence and frequency not allowed by more 
traditional means of communication; second, information technology opens new avenues 
for female participation in insurgencies as women assume new roles as bloggers, 
webmasters, and execute online information operations by using social media, television, 
and mobile networks to appeal directly to a women audience. The following sections will 
discuss the use of information technology by the EZLN and the FARC to associate their 
movements with the progressive cause of women’s rights. The first part highlights how 
the promotion of women’s rights by the Chiapas insurgents helped to publicize the issue 
more generally and, by association, boosted the cause of the EZLN. The second part 
focuses on the strategic messaging used by the FARC to burnish its otherwise tarnished 
image during peace talks ongoing at the time of writing in Havana, by presenting itself as 
a champion of women’s rights. 
1. Chiapas and the Internet 
Globalization and expansion of communications technology has given even 
relatively obscure insurgent movements access to national and international audiences. 
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Digital media have the advantage of interaction over print or radio delivery, although 
both continue to be used.268 First, new IT technology reduces the risk of capture and 
harassment by security forces, as the content production and transmission can be located 
in neutral countries. Second, IT becomes a strategic communications recruiting tool to 
draw in new enthusiasts including women. This protracts the conflict, which increases the 
potential for success.269 Third, by quickly disseminating their versions of events via the 
Internet, terrorist groups can keep the government on the defensive, and therefore, 
improve what some have called their frame amplification,270 or in the words of Bruce 
Hoffman, “perception management.”271 Fourth, the information revolution has the 
potential to bypass and to a degree delegitimize the government by bringing together 
numerous NGOs and their financial supporters to avert the need to rely on governmental 
services.272 This technique of advertising and providing alternative services worked well 
for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Sadr Movement in Iraq.273 Finally, the 
anonymity of the Internet encourages involvement in a cause by intensifying levels of 
anger while lowering the perceived risks of pursuit.274 In this way, the Internet becomes a 
vehicle to express grievances against governments by mouse clicks rather than physical 
attacks. Non-state actors and insurgents take advantage of this new trend to advance their 
strategic goals, by broadening their influence and base of support to the international 
level. The challenge for the non-state actors is how to communicate purely local 
grievances in ways comprehensible to an international public. 
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Figure 19.  October 2012 Zapatista Campaign Poster UK-based support group.275 
The EZLN is known for their innovative and efficient use of information 
technology. José Gurría, former Mexican Foreign Affairs Secretary, said, “Chiapas has 
been a war of ink, written words, a war on the Internet.”276 Figure 19 is an example of 
newspaper headlines. The social justice and equality message quickly persuaded 
domestic and international NGOs to join the struggle and propagate the EZLN’s agenda. 
See Figure 21 for example of 2014 propaganda that still supports the Zapatista struggle. 
Karen Kampwirth argues that the “Zapatista Rebellion is also a women’s rebellion.”277 
The EZLN included ten demands in the Revolutionary Women’s Law regarding women’s 
rights in their first proclamation.278 The proclamation focused on a woman’s right to 
choose her partner and the number of children she could conceive. It called for the 
participation of women in community politics, and even in the fighting and leadership of 
the rebellion.279 Their strategic messaging regarding gender issues resonated in places 
like Italy, the United States, in neighboring Latin American countries, and more 
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importantly, inside Mexico. The Mexican government felt the pressure from international 
civil rights advocates and free-trade economic partners to peacefully resolve the 
situation.280 The government retook the contested areas militarily; however, despite 
government occupation, communities in Chiapas have declared themselves as unilaterally 
autonomous, the EZLN organization continues to survive, and governance remains a 
contested issue in the region.281 The Chiapas case illustrates how strategic messaging can 
enhance the bargaining power of a militarily weaker armed non-state actor. Angela M. 
Giordano argued, “What marks the Zapatista rebellion as extraordinary is its emergence 
as one of the first information age insurgencies to make such efficient use of these 
mediums [internet propaganda].”282 
 
Figure 20.  Newspaper title collage.283  
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Strategic balance “refers to the relative capabilities of the two sides to achieve 
their respective strategic objectives in relation to the other.”284 In the case of the EZLN 
and the Mexican government, the shift of the insurgent’s main tool of persuasion from 
armed struggle to mass communication, gave the insurgents the strategic advantage and 
increased their resources. Around the world, numerous international organizations 
collected money and goods for refuges in support of the EZLN.285 Angela Giordano 
stated that the Zapatistas were “able to reach over 25,000 activists and organizations in 
more than 130 countries.”286 The EZLN goals were to gain autonomy for the region, 
improve the democratic system in Mexico, obtain equal citizenship for indigenous 
people, promote women’s rights, and more education, health, and governmental services 
for the communities. Their message was well received at the international level because 
the values of social equality, justice, women’s rights, and liberty were universal 
regardless of the language or culture.  
The EZLN exploited common grievances and drafted several communications 
over the Internet and other media that framed the nature of the struggle. This gave 
legitimacy to the insurgents and shifted the dynamic of mass communication away from 
the Mexican government.287 The new strategy of attacking the reputation of the Mexican 
government internationally and domestically by using information technology persuaded 
the authorities to constrain their violence. Previously the Mexican regimes dealt with 
protesters violently. In 1968, several hundred protesters were massacred by state in 
antigovernment policy demonstrations in Mexico’s Tlatelolco Square.288 Figures 21 and 
22 display examples of propaganda that portray the current EZLN struggle. 
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Figure 21.  EZLN Rebel Dignity of Women Propaganda.289 
 
Figure 22.  Film Director Oliver Stone and EZLN Sub-commander Marcos.290 
Bruce Hoffman posits, “The implications of this [terrorist capability to bypass 
state control of communications] development are enormous.”291 Hoffman argues that 
the messaging can be for supporters, security forces, and internal use.292 He also 
interprets terrorist activity as a way to “attract attention and then, through the publicity it 
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generates, to communicate a message.”293 Hoffman’s views are supported by the case of 
Chiapas. In the words of Sub Commander Marcos, “in a war, the decisive thing is not the 
military confrontation, but the politics at stake in the confrontation. We didn't go to war 
to kill or be killed. We went to war in order to be heard.”294 The EZLN men and women 
drew attention to their cause by conducting violent acts against the security forces and 
those civilians that resisted. On the other hand, the quote could be a way to minimize 
their military defeat. On the other hand, the EZLN support grew more effective 
internationally and domestically after they ceased the nine days of violence. International 
organizations like the International Service for Peace (SIPAZ), human rights groups, and 
other non-governmental organizations intervened with services already provided by the 
central Mexican government. The strategic balance favored the side of the Zapatistas, 
because they presented themselves as fighting for a just cause in the eyes of the 
international community, while the NGOs around the world and inside Mexico organized 
protested on their behalf.  
Nevertheless, the EZLN fell short of accomplishing all of their objectives stated 
in their manifesto and agreements negotiated in the San Andres Accords. In February 
1996, in San Andres, the government of Mexico and representatives of the EZLN agreed 
to reduce military presence in the area, respect indigenous authority, judicial reform, 
greater autonomy, and equality of gender under the law.295 Among the provisions agreed 
stands out the following clause: 
Social policy must promote priority programs to improve health and 
nutritional standards among the children of indigenous peoples; it must 
also support, on an egalitarian basis, the training of women, expanding 
their participation in the organization and development of the family and 
the community. Priority must be given to the involvement of indigenous 
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women in decisions regarding projects for economic, political, social, and 
cultural development.296 
However, the EZLN survived as an organization, resisted state repression and 
persecution, and gained legitimacy and support for their agenda from the Mexican 
Congress and Executive branch. Because of the rebellion in Chiapas, the Zapatistas 
created new modes of interaction with the central government. They established five 
autonomous administrations called Caracoles (Snails) with individual Juntas de Buen 
Gobierno (Communities of Good Governance) in 2003, conducted a referendum on 
indigenous rights in 1999, participated as observers in the national elections, and gained 
substantial investment in education and infrastructure. The influence of women in the 
insurgency led to expansion of the feminist agenda in the communities. Today, the 
“Zapatista women are aware of their rights, are able to choose whom they marry, and 
know that if their husband uses violence against them, the community assembly will 
intervene and defend the woman.”297 Neil Harvey argued that the result of the Chiapas 
uprising was to “shift[ing] the balance of forces in favor of popular and democratic 
movements.”298 Stemming from Harvey’s analysis of the root cause for the uprising, one 
can conclude that the events in Chiapas were successful in expanding democratic values 
throughout Mexico. More importantly, use of media and the management of the uprising 
prevented the violent repression of the state. The popular support gained internationally 
through the media gave the EZLN protection from the Mexican authorities. 
David Ronfeldt, from the Rand Corporation, describes the Zapatista as a 
“netwar.”299 Ronfeldt argued that, “networks are superior to hierarchies-still used by 
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governments and the military.”300 The Chiapas use of the Internet decentralized the 
struggle to an almost leaderless resistance directed by international ideals rather than 
masked men and women in the jungle. The Zapatista’s information technology tilted the 
strategic balance in their favor. In Ronfeldt’s later book with John Arquilla, they 
reemphasized how the Zapatistas “put the Mexican government on the defensive during 
1994–1998.”301 
In the Chiapas case study, the EZLN thwarted the state repressive actions. The 
Mexican government’s previous handling of similar challenges to its authority had 
resulted in blood baths. The EZLN’s control of the messaging drove the government to 
negotiations and to invest millions of dollars in the region. The uprising raised the specter 
of foreign disinvestment in Mexico, which at the time was crucial for their development 
and competition against Southern Cone rival Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 
alliance. The Mexican government had experienced previous revolts and protests. 
However, the Zapatista uprising proved a greater challenge and raised political costs, not 
only locally but also internationally. The Mexican government still today has not fully 
gained control of the region, after granting the Zapatistas numerous concessions and 
autonomy not available in any other region in Mexico.  
In summary, control of information through technological innovation can shift 
resources and public opinion to the militants inside a territory, if the message resonates 
with the audience. Women in insurgencies can benefit from technology by including their 
feminist agenda and by eliciting popular sympathy for a cause presented as just. The 
participation of women in revolutionary insurgencies in Chiapas benefited from the 
media and information technology to gain support of a broader audience. The Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs considers that the Revolutionary Women’s Law of 1993, proposed 
by the Zapatistas, was critical in securing women rights in the region.302 The inclusion of 
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feminist agenda in the insurgency proclamations attracted numerous NGOs who remain 
in the region to provide services. The information battle over the nature of the 
revolutionary movement hindered government counterstrategies, increased military and 
infrastructure spending, and risked the legitimacy of the regime among international 
partners resulting in greater autonomy for the Chiapas region and their women. Other 
groups in Latin America used the revolution in their countries to advance women’s rights 
with mixed results. Women in El Salvador, more than Nicaragua, felt disenfranchised 
once the revolutions concluded.303 The following section will focus on how the FARC-
EP women are currently using technology and the media to shift attention to gender 
issues. 
F. ROLE OF FARC-EP WOMEN AND THE INTERNET 
On October 11, 2013, the FARC-EP women launched the Website Farianas: 
Mujeres de Las FARC-EP (Farianas: Women of the FARC-EP), with the intent to 
promote the female guerrilla groups’ experience, and advance Colombian women’s 
struggle against the perceived regime injustice. The website’s catch phrase is translated 
as “the FARC-EP also has a women’s face.”304 What they are trying to make clear to the 
domestic and international community is that the FARC-EP is a united struggle of men 
and women. The website is a combination of guerrilla propaganda, world events, news 
about women in Colombian culture, and a blog about the role of women in the current 
peace negotiations in Cuba. The website comes almost twenty years after the EZLN 
promoted women rights on the worldwide web. 
The Farianas and Chiapas female guerrillas use technology as an outlet to 
promote their revolutionary ideals while promoting women rights; however, the FARC-
EP used the Internet as a way to break away from men controlled communication outlets. 
The FARC-EP male leadership acknowledges that is something new, and that women 
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earned to have their own space in the Internet to communicate.305 There is still some 
skepticism about the initiative even in the FARC-EP Supreme Leader and Bloc 
Commander, Timoleón Jiménez, calling the initiative “a beautiful adventure.”306 The 
FARC-EP women shifted their communication strategy because of the organization’s 
failure to respond effectively to the government’s own anti-guerrilla campaign, persuade 
peace talk negotiators to include women rights in the agenda, and help the overall support 
for the revolutionary movement. 
 
Figure 23.  Tanja Nijmeijer reflecting on the death of alias Alfonso Cano in 
2011.307 
The strategic messaging on the part of the women in the FARC-EP can be 
interpreted as a response to the information operations, led by the Colombian 
government. The Colombian Ministry of Defense invested thousands of dollars to counter 
the guerrilla message all over the country, with a media campaign that included radio, 
television, and social media Websites like You Tube and Facebook. Part of the campaign 
targeted women by using demobilized ex-guerrillas as the prime spokespersons in the 
radio and television commercials. The ex-guerrilla of the FARC, known as Karina, is the 
highest female ex-militant to demobilize. Karina spent twenty-four years as part of the 
FARC-EP, and formed part of the leadership of the forty-seventh front of this 
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organization.308 The government used Karina in an online and television campaign to 
encourage women to leave the FARC-EP.309  
Like Karina, many other demobilized women joined the government in their anti-
guerrilla campaign. In 2011, the military radio stations in Cali sponsored time featuring 
demobilized women talking about the negative experiences and calling for others to leave 
the insurgent group.310 The television media also had commercials, which encouraged 
women to ‘feel women again,’ and alluded to the right of motherhood and opportunities 
after the guerrilla life.311 Unlike the EZLN’s use of the Internet, which put the Mexican 
government on the defensive, the Farinas Website was the FARC’s reaction to the 
Colombian government’s aggressive media campaign to point up FARC crimes, and their 
cynical exploitation of female guerrillas. On the first day of the website, Farianas the 
FARC-EP women issued a statement calling themselves victims of a malicious media 
campaign that discredits their participation in the organization and labels them as victims 
of their male camaradas.312 One can find numerous references of the FARC-EP’s 
concern over the government’s messaging campaign towards women. Tomás Molinares, 
directly responded through the website to the governments messaging efforts. Molinares 
stated that “the counterinsurgents find the topic of gender as a weak link of the guerrilla . 
. . [and] the messages of abortion, love, and maternity . . . want to break the insurgency 
ranks and delegitimize in the eyes of the people.”313 
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In Colombia, 55 percent of the population has access to the Internet, and women 
represent over 50 percent of the population.314 The new strategic message over cyber 
space, led by the women in the FARC-EP, has two other purposes: first, recruit and gain 
support of the international community; and second, incorporate female participation in 
the negotiations. Timoleón Jiménez alluded to the dual mission of the website by stating, 
“from your perspective, can revolutionary women help expand awareness, or move more 
people to fight for a country and a better world, even closer to the day of triumph?”315 
President Juan Manuel Santos administration answered this message in November 2013 
by including two females in the government team to peace negotiations in Havana.316 
President Santos wanted women able to discuss female issues in the affected areas. He 
picked Nigeria Rentería Lozano because of her public service to the most affected 
regions. Rentería will assure focus on gender issues and equality throughout the process 
on behalf of the government.317 
The Farianas Website is one of the main messaging outlets for men and women in 
the FARC. Although the forum is by and for women, men have felt the need to give their 
opinion on topics related to gender. Tomás Molinares, guerrilla fighter and member of 
the Delegation for Peace in Cuba, lashed out through the Farianas Website against the 
government, accusing them of espousing the “hypocrisy of the oligarchy,”318 and of 
trying to gain political points with women in the upcoming elections by including women 
in the negotiations. 
Technology and social media is changing the role of some women inside the 
FARC-EP—women are used to post blogs, stories, and strategic communication to 
counter the Colombian government. Marc Sageman posits that the type of people with 
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access and knowledge of these new technologies are, “transforming the threat in terms of 
age and gender of the terrorist.”319 The timing of the website takes full advantage of the 
international media in Cuba covering the events related to the peace negotiations. The 
rebranding of the FARC-EP image still has to overcome the many stories of abortion, 
rape, and abuse inside the organization told by demobilized women. The Colombian 
government reported that from the 244 women demobilized in the year 2012–2013, 43 
spoke of forced abortions.320 The FARC’s appeal for sympathy towards guerrilla fighters, 
who have a history of after almost 50 years of abuse and terror against women, will be 
hard to overcome. 
In summary, the women in the Zapatista and FARC-EP insurgencies use 
technology to bring attention to gender issues to domestic and international audience. The 
Zapatista women focused on incorporating their gender needs as part of the original 
demands to the government, which helped broaden the international perception of the 
Chiapas movement. The FARC-EP females are trying to interconnect their experience 
inside the revolutionary struggle with broader gender movements inside Colombia, by 
using different media outlets to expand their audience. Unlike the EZLN, the FARC 
effort was a belated, reactive one. The FARC-EP women working on strategic messaging 
over the Internet had to overcome 50 years of negative news, disenfranchised women 
testimonies, and other damaging information written about the organization’s sexual 
slavery, coercion of girls, and forced abortions. At best, it forced the Colombian 
government to include females in their negotiating team in Havana. On the other hand, 
Chiapas guerrillas enjoyed little negative perception toward women, because of their 
short history. The EZLN exploited an image of defenders of women’s civil rights, 
education, and healthcare. The FARC-EP’s current strategic messaging about the female 
needs can provoke a different outcome from the FMLN and FSLN, whose gender issues 
were not recognized in the immediate post-conflict negotiations. The role of women in 
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insurgencies in Latin America will continue to change as militant organizations adapt to 
modern technology. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Women participate in insurgencies in Latin America as sympathizers, spies, 
warriors, and dominant forces; however, the shift in roles depends on four main factors: 
first, the method of recruitment; second, skills needed inside the organization; third, 
willingness to assume greater responsibility; and finally, personal relationships. These 
four factors can also determine the level of satisfaction inside the organization. For 
example, in the case of Tanja Nijmeijer, she joined the organization for political reasons, 
which drove her to assume greater responsibilities in the area of political-military affairs. 
Tanja during recent interviews broadcasted over the Internet and international television, 
displayed high levels of satisfaction and sense of accomplishment by landing a seat as a 
negotiator in Cuba.321 Elda Neyis Mosquera Garcia’s experience was quite different. She 
joined the organization because of protection, boredom, and a sense of empowerment, 
which kept her working in the role of guerrilla fighter. The role of fighter or warrior 
exposed Edna (Karina) to an exciting life, where as a woman she could gain respect 
through violence. In the case of Edna, the violence that propelled her through the ranks 
also caused dissatisfaction and later her demobilization. The majority of women that 
joined an insurgency willingly displayed some level of empowerment. The exception is 
those women that were pushed into the insurgency unwillingly. The anonymity of the 
Internet, and other advancements in technology, enable women to become more active in 
strategic communication and propaganda because of the low risk and decentralized nature 
of the media; however, the utility of this new machinery depends on the history of the 
conflict and level of information operation that it is attempting to resist. 
                                                
321 Peterson, “Dutch Woman Explains.” 
 89 
V. WOMEN, INSURGENCY, AND DEMOBILIZATION 
The need to engage the female population for counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan has been underestimated for the better part of 10 years. 
—Maj. Patrick McCarthy 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As the U.S. military continues to face challenges to national interests abroad, it is 
evident that it must consider the significant role that women will continue to play in 
insurgency. Therefore, U.S. counterinsurgency operations should include gender into the 
human terrain analysis when devising strategies, both in combat and during 
demobilization. While theorists of counterinsurgency, like David Galula, speak of the 
critical importance of co-opting female allegiance,322 current military COIN doctrine, 
and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) practices fail to emphasize the 
role and special requirements of women. The following remarkable asymmetry results: 
while insurgents themselves frequently realize the vital role played by women in 
revolutionary success, and find imaginative and useful ways to incorporate them into 
their organizations, COIN approaches to female engagement have proven tardy, ad hoc, 
frequently clumsy or self-defeating. 
The United States and other countries struggle to understand the human terrain 
and gender issues in insurgencies. For insurgents using terrorist tactics, gender still 
remains a communication weapon that dramatizes their message. The recent increase of 
spectacular suicide bombings performed by Chechen women in Russia, has catapulted the 
discussion of gender in insurgencies, and more specifically, in suicide terrorist tactics to 
front-page news. In December 2013, two female suicide bombers detonated explosives at 
a train station and on a bus in Volgograd, Russia, causing major security concerns for the 
2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. The headline news around the world centered on the 
gender of the perpetrators, rather than the destruction and death caused. News reporters 
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and pundits assailed the morality of terrorist groups that enlist women to perform such 
acts. Moscow based correspondent Ana Nemstova investigated historical trends, and 
found that “in the last 12 years, 46 women have turned themselves into suicide bombers 
in Russia, committing 26 terrorist attacks (some attacks involved multiple women). Most 
of the bombers were from Chechnya and Dagestan.”323 A Chechen insurgent separatist 
group that opposes both President Vladimir Putin and U.S. policy in the Middle East 
accepted responsibility for the terrorist attacks. Many Chechen women become pro-
Muslim and pro-Chechnya activists out of political motivations. For the most radical 
among them, suicide bombing becomes an acceptable tactic to communicate their deep 
grievances. Therefore, one obvious conclusion to draw is that political radicalism is not 
gender specific.  
Counterinsurgent practices continue to focus on threats coming from military-
aged men in fatigues, rather than a woman in a hijab. The identification and targeting of 
females fighters, as in the case of recent Russian bombings in Volgograd, surprised the 
authorities and forced the government to implement expensive security measures. The 
2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi deployed about 40,000-law enforcement officers and 
imposed other security measures throughout the country.324 
One contention of this chapter is that military COIN effectiveness could increase 
if strategies, operations, and tactics factor in females as part of the human terrain of the 
battlefield. While women figure most prominently in Latin American insurgent groups as 
combatants, supporters, and leaders,325 they are also present in insurgencies in Asia, 
Central Asia, Europe, and Africa. The U.S. military perception towards women as docile 
and motherly figures incapable of violence, contributes to the view gender is irrelevant to 
COIN success. Indeed, U.S. soldiers generally view women as non-combatants. This 
section will argue that U.S. COIN operations resist factoring gender-oriented policies for 
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four primary reasons. First, it regard COIN primarily as an offensive operation focused 
on military-aged male fighters. Second, the human terrain is complex and gender roles in 
insurgencies are not understood in depth. Third, the military resists employing females in 
COIN operations because until recently laws excluded them from combat. Finally, 
insurgencies in some quarters are seen as essentially criminal endeavors in which women 
play at most a limited role. This deemphasizes the social dimension of COIN, and puts a 
premium on decapitation strategies, and even neo-liberal economic approaches that may 
further disaggregate societies under stress. It is important to consider that COIN is an 
operational process, rather than an end state. Therefore, DDR should integrate gender 
considerations once the population has shifted to the side of the counterinsurgent. The 
case study of Colombia, a close U.S. partner, provides insight on how a lack of gender 
sensitivity discourages female demobilization as well as undermines their reintegration 
into the community once the decision is taken to demobilize. 
B. WOMEN IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS 
During the last decade, the U.S. military developed new concepts that focused on 
winning the “hearts and minds” of the population, like human terrain teams. However, 
these teams frequently failed to devise strategies to deal with the female population. 
While Western counterinsurgents understand that gender relationships are fundamental to 
the order of every society, they fail fully to comprehend what role women play from a 
social or political perspective that differs from those of their fathers, brothers, husbands, 
or sons. Even if women oppose the insurgency, what impact will this have? Female 
suicide bombers, who have become prominent tools in the Middle East and South East 
Asia, contradict the Western perception that women play little part in combat.  
The U.S. military still has laws and regulations that limit the participation of 
women in combat. On the other hand, in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, female suicide 
bombers carried out forty-three attacks, resulting in 748 deaths, and 1,507 wounded.326 
Meanwhile, the Army and Marine Corps doctrinal and tactical manuals devote barely two 
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paragraphs to the importance of women in insurgency. The section in the doctrinal 
manual that mentions women is entitled: “Engage the Women; Be Cautions around the 
Children.”327 Clearly, the focus of COIN on women in insurgency is not a priority, nor is 
it much different than the engagement of children in battle. 
Other official government guidelines avoid any gender-specific considerations by 
design and practice.328 COIN tactics designed to co-opt communities often fall short of 
effectively influencing the political, sectarian, or tribal-based communities by focusing 
almost exclusively on deterring, demobilizing, or killing male fighters as a method to 
create security. In this way, the U.S. military missed the opportunity to address half of the 
population and a significant portion of the support base for counterinsurgencies. 
The initial operations in Iraq and Afghanistan failed to engage women, in part so 
as not to offend Muslim sensibilities. However, this left women more vulnerable to 
recruitment, and aided the insurgents in various ways—as logisticians, collectors, and 
disseminators of intelligence, or even as participants in violent attacks. In 2007, President 
Bush approved a surge of 20,000 U.S. troops, mainly in Iraq’s Anbar province, to secure 
and co-opt the population, rather than perform kill-or-capture operations against 
insurgents. Insurgent groups changed tactics, which included an aggressive recruitment of 
females for suicide attacks. The number of women performing suicide attacks increased 
from five in 2007, to twenty-six the following year, resulting in over 389 deaths, and 80 
injured.329 In 2008 in Dhuluiya, Iraq, eighteen women participating in the terrorist 
organization Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQM), took advantage of an amnesty plan to 
demobilize, although, how far this could be attributed to female engagement is 
unclear.330 
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From 2009–2012, the U.S. Marine Corps created Female Engagement Teams 
(FETs) in Afghanistan to focus on communicating with, and gathering intelligence from, 
Afghan females. The new established units were indeed capable of gaining access to 
Afghan households in a non-intrusive way, if the arrivals of a U.S. platoon armed-to-the-
teeth can be defined as non-intimidating. To the surprise of some U.S. officers, the FETs 
were mostly well received, or at least tolerated, by the local Afghan population, although 
the reasons for this are not entirely clear.  
Washington Post correspondent Tom Ricks reported that on occasion, Afghan 
women invited military females inside houses, while U.S. males remained on the 
perimeter of the compound.331 FET teams not only broke barriers inside infantry patrols, 
but also pioneered the approach of gathering intelligence and engaging the Afghan 
communities literally from inside their homes. Ricks quoted a villager in Afghanistan, 
commentating on the perception of FETs in operations “your men come to fight, but we 
know the women are here to help.”332 The U.S. military was slow to understand that 
although women lived in a patriarchal society, they still played a critical role inside the 
home, and on occasion, beyond. A 2008 Human Terrain Teams (HTT) report pointed this 
out: 
HTT approached individuals the military does not usually address—
women, children, etc.—asking what was important to them. This would 
start conversations that others would join . . . The Taliban targets 
vulnerable portions of the population such as medical professionals, 
women, and schools . . . Midwives are a key target audience. They have 
status as the medical care providers to females in the rural villages; they 
are permitted to travel outside the village; and they are the main source of 
news, commentary, and gossip for women. They are often targeted by the 
Taliban for this reason. Actions to assist, train, and protect midwives will 
reach a large audience quickly with a positive message.333 
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Some scholars posit that FETs broke normative barriers to the point that Afghan 
men saw women in FETs as a “third gender.”334 One significant downside of the FETs 
was that the U.S. military had underestimated the resistance of Afghan men to military 
women in operations. Afghans acted puzzled, when not shocked and repelled, by the 
spectacle of uncovered U.S. females in uniform, operating in the company of men who 
were not their husbands or brothers, an unthinkable transgression of Afghan social norms 
and customs. 
The recent positive evaluation of the effectiveness of women in 
counterinsurgency operations has its critics. However, the majority of later reports on the 
FETs and similar groups were positive.335 The results are not widespread and depend on 
the cultural nuances of the tribes. In a HTT social-cultural study of Spin Boldak District 
in Afghanistan, teams found it difficult to overcome traditional Pashtun cultural barriers. 
Nevertheless, the team still saw the value of having women in their ranks: 
However, if some men continue to reject our presence, even to visit their 
village, I suggest we still go and be in the background. Just having females 
with our Troops opens doors; we present a "softer" side, and both females 
and children respond to us. In addition, we have been engaging the men 
and this is no problem.336 
The same report also highlighted the benefit of having females in the patrols: 
The 'Lioness Program,' implemented in Iraq paid high dividends. The 
same should be applied here, especially given the condition of the females 
and children in this country. Just by seeing women out there, working 
alongside the men, assists our soldiers' efforts and the success of 
governance, reconstruction and development.337 
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 In 2004 in Iraq, the Lioness program provided U.S. forces with female soldiers or 
Marines to search for women during tactical seizures, at checkpoints, and in other 
gender-sensitive situations during combat operations. Initial attempts at female 
engagement by U.S. troops were ad hoc, lacked cultural sensitivity, and were limited to 
minor roles, because it was not a concern for the first few years of the war. Infantry 
patrols gathered females from support military specialties in the unit, and formed house 
search teams, or sent them to man checkpoints without the training experience to do such 
missions. Other programs, in which women participated, were the Provisional 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Special Operations Cultural Support Teams (CSTs), and 
Female Human Intelligence Exploitation Teams (FHETs).338 
It became apparent that gender insensitivity was alienating part of the population, 
and the non-linear battle space required more military, female participation in operations. 
The transition from an enemy-focused to a more people-focused counterinsurgency 
emphasis in Iraq, and later in Afghanistan, expanded the role of women in COIN. One 
general assumption is that in COIN operations, the goal of security forces is to break the 
links of support for the insurgency. In Afghanistan, the Taliban have a history of abusing 
and disenfranchising women that might make them vulnerable to U.S. outreach. Keally 
McBride and Annick Wibben posited in 2012 that the “outreach to women could be the 
key for isolating the insurgency from the local population.”339 They argue that FETs 
could shift the masculine nature of the war through engagement of females, which 
impacts families, and can influence the long-term memory of the communities. To 
support this claim, McBride and Wibben quote Nina D’Amato, U.S. Marine Corps 
Officer operating in Regional Command South West, who concluded that women in 
Afghan communities are sedentary, and provide the best continuity opportunity.340 
According to them, D’Amato insists that, “If you want your narrative entrenched, you 
                                                
338 Stephanie K. Erwin, “The Veil of Kevlar: An Analysis of the Female Engagement Teams in 
Afghanistan,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 9–14. 
339 Keally McBride and Annick T.R. Wibben, “The Gendering of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” 
Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 3, No. 2 
(Summer 2012), 206, doi: 10.1353/hum.2012.0012. 
340 Ibid., 206. 
 96 
focus on the women.”341 Furthermore they advance the idea that this less aggressive 
approach and focus on females and family offers a more civilized option that is likely to 
appeal to host nation citizens.342 As an added bonus, reframing the narrative of 
counterinsurgency through a gender lens can help gain support at home.343 For example, 
during the initial stages of the war in Afghanistan, the domestic narrative had some 
gender undertones in rhetoric. Former First Lady Laura Bush stated that the operations 
were also “a fight for the rights and dignity of women.”344 However, the execution took 
almost a decade to begin approaching them systematically during operations. A further 
complication is that, by pitching these latest wars as a crusade to empower Muslim 
females, it both presents a “clash of civilizations” dimension which may alienate many in 
the region, opens females who collaborate with the invading power to retaliation, while 
courting challenges of abandonment when the time for withdrawal comes. 
In conclusion, the effectiveness of appealing to women as part of a COIN 
operational approach depends upon mission goals, training, and motivation, as seen in the 
case of later versions of FETs in Afghanistan. Employing female U.S. personnel in COIN 
provided several advantages: first, they gathered valuable intelligence by interacting with 
Muslim females; second, the presence of U.S. women prompted a more positive attitude 
toward U.S. troops from male and female villagers alike; third, female engagement 
opened a communication channel to men through their wives, sisters, and mothers; 
finally, it was good domestic narrative to include a female agenda to bolster support for 
wars that seemed to be long, costly, without results, and which had little to do with U.S. 
interests.  
A more important advantage that women bring to U.S. COIN operations is that 
they advance gender equality in U.S. ranks. Tom Ricks argues that “the main barrier to 
more intensive and extensive use of the teams seems to be the inflexibility, not of Afghan 
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men, but of U.S. Marine and Army officers.”345 While the U.S. military continues to 
struggle with the integration of women in the military, insurgents continue to recruit, 
train, and employ women in insurgent and terrorist groups.346 The DOD has 
systematically sought to analyze and codify this experience of female engagement and to 
transform it into doctrine.  
C. COLOMBIA DDR AND GENDER MARGINALIZATION 
Like the United States, Colombia, a close partner, has been slow to recognize a 
female dimension to its endemic security problems. It is even more remarkable because 
females figure prominently, especially in Left-wing insurgent groups in that country, like 
the FARC and the ELN. These Leftist groups often include up to 30 percent of females in 
their ranks.347 Over the years, Colombia frequently reached peace negotiations, conceded 
safe havens to insurgents, and even applied the more standard counterinsurgent practice 
of mano dura tactics. However, these seemingly opposing security strategies shared a 
common tendency to ignore females, failed to develop any sort of outreach to women in 
communities, or until very recently to evolve specialized programs to demobilize and 
reintegrate former female combatants into society. Furthermore, the application of 
Defense and Democratic Security (DDS) policy from 2003 failed to address female 
victims of human rights violations. 
Between 2003 and 2006, the demobilization of the Auto-defense Units of 
Colombia (AUC) neglected female requirements, in part because, unlike Left-wing 
insurgent groups, the percentage of females in paramilitary groups was small. The Uribe 
government demobilized over 31,671 armed paramilitary soldiers, of which only 2,920 
were women.348 In a 2009 speech to the London School of Economics and Political 
Science, Former President Uribe spoke about the key factors that enabled his regime to 
gain control of the contested areas. 
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Governance was accomplished by the triangle of confidence. It is based on 
three key pillars: security with freedom, investment promotion with social 
responsibility, and the advancement of social cohesion . . . security and 
investment need validators to become a long-term investment.349 
Uribe promoted progress and development in Colombia by providing security, 
economic investment, and building cultural institutions. The Uribe regime called it 
Defense and Democratic Security (DDS), because the security efforts took place within a 
democratic framework. The logic was to seize control of territory and establish security 
measures that could improve democracy, which would push investment to the affected 
areas, and eventually improve the lives of the people. At the time, some NGOs claimed 
that the process was more smoke and mirrors than an actual assertion of state power, as 
elements of the AUC simply reconsolidated in a different form.350  
The additional goals of his policy were to arrest the internal violence and achieve 
peace, gain control of contested areas, protect the population, demobilize existing armed 
non-state actors, and regain the confidence of the people in the central government.351 To 
do so, the Colombian military expanded by a third, “from 192,000 in 2002, to 254,000 
members in 2006.”352 Additionally, the Uribe regime expanded “a national network of 
one million informants, and paying citizens for information.”353 
If the premise is that women form the core of communities, then according to 
Cristina Rojas, Uribe’s strategies have destroyed or at least imperiled those communities 
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through what she calls “securitization by dispossession.”354 Rojas argues that Uribe used 
the security crisis to deepen neoliberal economic reform, ignore land issues, and redefine 
the parameters of citizenship.355 In Rojas’ view, Uribe made the benefits of citizenship 
contingent on one’s degree of commitment to the security activities of the government.356 
The effects of participation in these reforms were felt more in the rural areas, where 
armed groups and their influence supporters continued to have influence despite 
“demobilization.” Land reform, always a sensitive issue in Colombia, failed to alleviate 
the grievances of the poor and rural habitants dispossessed by the conflict. Security 
became the excuse to repeat previous errors of taking land away for those who needed it 
most. As a consequence of these land reforms and militarization of security zones, “0.04 
percent of the owners possessed 61 percent of the land, [and] food insecurity 
increased.”357 The neoliberal economic reforms exacerbated grievances in the most rural 
areas that previously pushed male and females alike into the armed groups. 
Josefina Echevarria Alvarez argued that the Colombian government framed the 
insurgency as criminal in nature, rather than a social, economic, and political 
phenomenon.358 According to Echevarria, if armed groups are portrayed as fighting for 
control of the profit of drug trade rather than to change the political status quo, then the 
government no longer has to respond with reforms.359 This change in narrative from 
political to economic driven insurgency, seemed to resonate more on the Right, which 
dismissed social grievances as being root causes of the conflict and has opposed 
negotiations with the FARC. Echevarria concluded that the Uribe regime framed the 
conflict as the cause of the grievances; therefore, the “war will only end when the enemy 
is defeated militarily.”360 This perspective that the enemy was merely a band of criminals 
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undermined a more measured approach to DDR, one that included recognition of gender 
specific requirements. Until quite recently (when id this change?), DDR of insurgents 
was under military control.  
The Program for Humanitarian Assistance to the Demobilized Persons (PAHD) is 
under the administration of the Ministry of Defense, and investigations of human rights 
violations by the military fall under the military justice system authority.361 The 
militarization of the demobilization process shielded further action from civilian scrutiny. 
Human rights observers are caught in the middle of the conflict, between the regime, the 
guerrillas, and Right-wing paramilitary or criminal organizations. In 2012, “at least forty 
human rights defenders and community leaders, and twenty trade union members were 
killed.”362 Female organizations received threats, and “some were raped in order to 
punish and silence them.”363 
The DDS plan addressed females as victims of human rights violations, and not as 
perpetrators in need of reintegration and rehabilitation. Herrera and Porch argued, 
“Female fighters continue to be seen as collateral victims of male violence.”364 The 
majority of the proposed reforms in the DDS focused on treating females and children in 
the same category, similar to the U.S. COIN doctrine. Plan Colombia, a security plan 
dating from 2000 funded in part by the United States, acknowledged that the conflict 
altered gender roles among thousands of internally displaced persons (IDP), by placing 
increased responsibilities on females as head of households. The security strategies failed 
to address deep grievances caused by gender violence in rural areas, which may be a 
significant factor in the recruiting of female insurgents seduced by the prospect that 
inclusion in armed groups may improve their lives. 
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Kimbery Theidon believes that DDR is the key to consolidation of peace, and a 
process that could transform the relationship between individuals and the community.365 
The process of reintegrating former combatants is complicated, as seen in the post-
conflict reconstruction in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. For example, in the 
post-conflict period in El Salvador, women felt disenfranchised from the political party of 
the FMLN, fragmenting the preexisting networks of female guerrillas into women 
organizations.366 The lack of support for women’s rights in society, and demands from 
the newly established political party created divisions among female supporters of the 
FMLN that did not exist prior to the peace process.367 In Colombia, the situation is 
different, because DDR is being carried out while conflict is still active.368 Because 
former female guerrillas may face violence if they attempt to return to their original 
communities, “85 percent of those who individually chose to leave armed groups . . . live 
[later] in Bogotá and Medellín.”369 
Several organizations that practice DDR concur with the importance of 
consideration of gender, during the reintegration. During the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies 2008 DDR Course, the attendees 
attributed the shortcomings of DDR programs to their “focus on processing of adult male 
ex-combatants to the detriment of female combatants, child soldiers, support personnel, 
and combatants families.”370 Porch and Rasmussen evaluated Uribe’s DDR as successful 
overall. However, they cited the lack of flexibility of Colombian DDR to adapt 
“programs to the experience, ethnicity, gender, or age of the participants, or to regional 
variants.”371 The DDR process that began under Uribe applied to collective 
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demobilization of the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC). The main 
intention was to remove Right-wing armed groups so that the FARC could no longer 
claim that they needed to remain armed for their own protection. However, because many 
of the AUC simply reconsolidated under a different name, the logic of this argument has 
proven to be deceptive.372  
The Office of High Commissioner for Peace managed the process at the collective 
level through the Support Mission for the Peace Process in Colombia from the 
Organization of American States (Mission de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia de la 
Organización de los Estados Americanos (MAPP-OEA). At the individual level, the 
Ministry of Defense managed DDR through the Program for Humanitarian Attention to 
Demobilized People (PAHD). The High Commission for Reintegration (ACR) and the 
Ministry of Interior managed the reintegration process for both.373 The transition from 
fighter to a productive member of society for individuals could take more than 24 
months.374 During the demobilization process, the Committee for Laying Down Arms 
(CODA) certified demobilized guerrillas. The certification granted the demobilized 
access to training, monthly stipends, assistance to their families, and safety opportunities.  
The Uribe administration’s management of DDR was criticized for granting 
impunity for crimes, allowing the expansion of FARC controlled lands, and causing that 
the paramilitaries to transform themselves into criminal groups called ‘Bandas 
Criminales’ or BACRIM.375 As mentioned previously, the DDR process ignored needs of 
women such as childcare, medical treatment of sexual transmitted diseases product of 
sexual promiscuity or assault, reproduction training, and prevention of domestic 
violence.376 
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The reintegration of women into Colombian society depends on the capacity for 
them to form new patterns of interaction with partners and family members. The 
institution of family is essential for many cultures, including the Colombian culture. The 
process of demobilization interrupted gender relationships built inside the armed 
organizations. Women and men inside the family nucleus could not help break the cycle 
of domestic violence and sexual abuse. As seen in Chapter III, some women joined the 
guerrilla groups because of family ties, and intolerable conditions in the home. Focus on 
family planning, drug abuse prevention, and sexual education, could have helped break 
cycle of violence. Having stable and guerrilla-free families could not deter everyone from 
joining a terrorist or insurgent organization. However, it could provide conditions that 
would give women other choices.  
Social reform requires a combination of the rule of law to work. The DDR 
process reduced the levels of violence directly related to the conflict, and across the rest 
of Colombia. However, it did little to address women’s rights. Reform of the treatment of 
women in society in general could facilitate the transition of former female combatants 
into the communities. DDR programs could shift from a male focused reintegration, and 
adopt female and family focused policies to advance the transition for all fighters. 
Women in traditional social roles could encourage male participation in DDR. As seen 
earlier in the case of SL, women members co-opted the men to deceive the organization. 
In Colombia, women with strong traditional roles could form strong families that could 
appeal to demobilized men by providing stable relationships. 
Demobilized female insurgents need the support to reinforce traditional and 
nontraditional gender roles, because typically, DDR places the requirement to end 
violence and disarm groups over the needs of women in demobilization. Mendez found 
that “the types of medical care, childcare requirements, and education needs of women 
ex-combatants are different from those of men ex-combatants.”377 
In summary, Colombia’s gender-neutral approach to DDR limited the 
effectiveness of the reintegration of former female insurgent combatants into society. The 
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application of DDR as a gender-free approach failed to address those who were victims 
of human rights abuses, and so isolated and disenfranchised a great portion of the 
demobilized females. The stigma created toward those associated with armed groups 
hindered the reintegration of females into their communities. Colombian women often 
joined armed groups to escape violence, improve their opportunities, or because of family 
ties to other guerrilla members. DDR programs did nothing to address those conditions, 
assuming that security and economic opportunity created by neo-liberal policies would 
take care of the problem. The DDR process of Colombia is an example of how the focus 
on security could isolate portions of the population, specifically women, which make 
them vulnerable. 
D. CONCLUSION 
U.S. COIN doctrine and Colombia DDR are examples of areas where 
governments underestimate the importance of the role of women. The lack of 
understanding of the role played by women in insurgent groups hinders the 
implementation of COIN efforts. The Department of Defense Combat Exclusion Policy 
for females contributes to reinforce the idea that war is the exclusive preserve of men. 
The U.S. military’s views of women in overseas operations reflect more cultural and 
organizational shortcomings than the reality on the ground. In 1991, during a 
congressional hearing, General Robert H. Barrow stated, “if you want to make a combat 
unit ineffective, assign some women to it. … In three wars—World War II, Korea, and 
Vietnam—I found no place for women to be down in the ground combat element.”378 
U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as Colombian security forces, 
struggle because of the cultural and social view of women as nourishing and caring 
mother figures, incapable of the physical tasks of combat, and incapable of violence. As 
the U.S. military gradually integrates women into combat branches, including the 
infantry, it will also need to refine views of females as a non-violent actor. On the other 
hand, insurgents fully recognize the adaptability and utility of females in their 
                                                




organizations. Henshaw summarizes this point by stating, “first, even if women are not 
fighting for the U.S., they may be fighting for the other side.”379 
It is also important for U.S. COIN operations to recognize that female 
demobilization is another form of female engagement. The case of Colombia highlights 
the need for active and enduring supervision and metrics to account for the equal and 
early integration of females into society. U.S. COIN operations have not seen mass 
female DDRs, and can learn from the Colombian experience, whose lessons include the 
following: 1) security forces that include females in all phases of the reintegration 
process; 2) work with host nation authorities to provide attention to women’s special 
needs like childcare, sexual transmitted diseases, and their reproductive health; and 3) 
women leaving insurgencies often demonstrating severe posttraumatic stress disorder, 
and psychological anxiety and depression. 
Drug surveys in countries with victims of insurgency violence, such as Peru, 
found that drug consumption among women was on the rise. Alcohol consumption in 
Peru rose from 81.5 percent in 1997, to 85.7 percent in females in 1999.380 They also 
found that anxiety and violence history exacerbate the dependency on drugs and 
anxiolytics.381 Domestic violence by male partners often contributed the abandonment of 
women, making them vulnerable to predatory criminal practices, or other insurgent 
groups. Demobilizing females can persuade other women and their male partners to join 
DDR efforts. The security of women combatants returning to their communities is at risk 
if the perception of them is negative. This could discourage other women who are might 
consider demobilizing. In Colombia, more than half of women fighters who demobilized 
preferred to stay near major cities, rather than return to their urban communities.382 There 
is still more to learn from the experience of governments and their handling of women 
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insurgents in Latin America. Chapter VI will focus on planning considerations that 
include women in insurgencies useful for policy makers, military, and statesman alike. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
Only through a shared appreciation of the people’s culture, needs, and 
hopes for the future can we hope to supplant the extremist narrative. 
—Admiral Michael Mullen 
former chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
A. MAJOR FINDINGS AND SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS 
This thesis seeks to add to the understanding of the complex operational 
environment of COIN, specifically on the aspect of women in insurgencies in Latin 
America. It has explored why women enlist in insurgencies, how far their expectations 
are met inside the organizations, they adapted to life in the guerrilla, and how their 
presence changed the attitudes and behavior of these insurgent organizations. The key 
points and findings are the following:  
First, the increased participation of women in insurgencies in Latin America 
occurred because of changes in the attitudes of men, who recognized their value both for 
ideological and operational reasons. Despite talk of gender equality and the fact that a 
handful of women have achieved influential positions in some groups, organizational 
needs, rather than a sudden commitment to female emancipation was the primary 
influence in this attitude change. In the 1960s and 1970s, male insurgent leaders 
witnessed the successful utilization of women in the Vietnamese independence 
movements and sought to replicate this successful model in Latin America. This marked 
a dramatic change from the Cuban Revolution, which saw only a minor participation of 
women as fighters. In fact, their role had been limited because of social attitudes, 
guerrilla tactics, and internal group machismo. The FSLN in Nicaragua may be seen as 
the Latin American pioneers of the enlistment and utilization of females in the 
insurgency. Women were hardly mere bystanders in this process—in fact, the FSLN was 
also reacting to the increase of political engagement by females. The causes of this are 
complex, but they involved faster means of communication, the interaction of women in 
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refugee situations in which they unexpectedly became head of households, and NGO 
activity that targeted women. 
A second, influence in the increasing engagement of women can be found in 
social networks spawned by a Church inspired by liberation theology. Liberation 
theology was instrumental to the recruitment, indoctrination, and mobilization of women 
in the refugee camps in Central American into revolutionary movements. The support 
networks organized through the Catholic Church spread the experience of women to 
adjacent countries contributing directly to an increase of females within similar timelines. 
This last point is important because it helps explain why Latin America has the most 
women participation in rebel groups in the world.383 Alexis Henshaw posits that the 
cross-cultural-regional differences occurred because of “the overlap between regional and 
ideological differences . . . insurgencies active in Latin America during this time period 
overwhelmingly adhere to Marxist ideology, and some groups in Central America 
cooperated or at least influenced one another.”384 This thesis argues that Henshaw’s 
observation is correct and adds that liberation theology in Central America was 
instrumental to this described interaction among insurgencies. Furthermore, this research 
concludes that the contribution of liberation theology goes beyond creating structures of 
mobilization, but also influenced the identity of the oppressed population by providing 
them with a just reason for using violence. This factor is extremely important in the 
development of an insurgency decision-making process to choose violence over other 
available political venues.385 Of course, there are exceptions, the most notable being the 
FARC-EP that remains hostile to religion in the historic anti-clerical traditions of the 
Latin American left. 
Additionally, the impact of the support of external forces in insurgencies in Latin 
America contributed to the development of a revolutionary counterculture, which was 
appealing to middle and peasant women. As described in Chapter III, Cuban ideological 
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and material support was an important factor to the insurgents because it helped 
strengthen the rebel group’s resilience and ability to resist regime pressure. The longevity 
of the struggle, repressive state actions, the perceived durability of insurgent movements, 
and an absence of viable alternatives in the limited universe of the Latin American 
peasant offered a revolutionary alternative in which some men and women were willing 
to invest. An egalitarian narrative, promoted by insurgent groups taken from the Cuban 
Revolution, was especially attractive to women, at least in theory. David Galula said it 
best, “the best cause for the insurgent’s purpose, by definition, can attract the largest 
number of supporters and repel the minimum of opponents.”386 The involvement of U.S. 
support for the existing regimes encouraged anti-American sentiment and legitimized the 
insurgent’s assertion that capitalism and northern influence was the cause of the deep 
social-economical grievances. These conditions influenced women to prefer Leftist 
insurgencies to Right wing groups because their interests were better represented and the 
later was usually associated with the existing regime’s forms of power and control. 
Third, women are not necessarily deterred from enlisting because of the lack of 
success of the insurgencies. For example, SL and FARC continue to survive although 
their ability to overthrow the governments of Peru and Colombia respectively appears 
remote. Although reduced in numbers, between 30–40 percent of these insurgencies are 
made up of women. What does influence female participation, as well as a general 
influence in the public, is the failure by insurgent groups to engage Church-sponsored 
activist networks. Again, the main advantage of Central American insurgencies over 
Andean ones studied in this thesis was the willingness to interact with networks. These 
networks provided greater human and monetary capital, which let the administrative arm 
of the organization focus on political matters rather than mere survival. 
Fourth, women join insurgencies for both ideological and personal reasons. 
However, little is said in the current literature on how women shift from political support 
to enlistment as active guerrillas. There are four factors that determine the decision to 
become more active: a decision by insurgent groups to recruit women; skills required 
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within the organization that women can fulfill; a willingness on the part of females to 
assume greater responsibility within the organization; and personal relationships. Figure 
24 attempts to sum up the most common characteristics discussed in the female case 
studies in Chapter IV for the recruitment and promotion of females within insurgent 
organizations. For example, the FMLN recruited Nidia Díaz because of her capacity to 
mobilize and organize as demonstrated by her activity in networks such as university 
student groups. She participated in similar activities during her time in the FMLN. On the 
other hand, for uneducated females, advancement inside the guerrilla organizations 
required fighting experience and proof of political indoctrination. Drawing from Mao’s 
assertion that a good guerrilla fighter is one who has a solid political commitment, the 
insurgencies in Latin America constantly reinforced Marxist-Leninist political teaching 
and mixed it with a narrative that appealed to the female identity. Initially, women’s roles 
were limited to logistics, messaging, nursing, informants, smuggling, and other 
supporting roles (see Figure 24 for comparison of upper mobility and characteristics). 
The mid-level leadership, like Karina in the FARC, highlights that an extensive combat 
record, experience (leadership), discipline, and capacity to commit violence were key for 
her to achieve leadership positions. The factors that propel women into higher-level 
leadership roles can be a combination of skills in any from any of the three levels. 
However, personal ties and education seam to distinguish female leadership in the highest 
echelons. It is still unclear, because of lack of information, at what point women willingly 
decide to accept greater responsibility inside the organizations. For example, in the case 
of the FARC-EP, one can suggest two possibilities: first, that woman decided to seek 
greater responsibility because they wanted to improve their status within the organization. 
Second, that as the Colombian regime’s decapitation of male leadership succeeded, 
women stepped up to fill the vacuum. The aging leadership, distracted with drug 
smuggling operations to survive, failed to build a robust male cadre to replace them, 
opening space for qualified women (experienced fighters with political skills) to advance 
into better positions. It is equally true that in the last few years, the Colombian security 
forces have also focused on demobilizing female guerrillas as well—witness Karina and 
an increasing effort put toward the demobilization of female guerrillas. Therefore, further 
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study on a composition of mid-level FARC cadres is required before one can firm up this 
assumption.  
Fifth, women in insurgency can benefit from advances of technology in two ways. 
First, the Internet provides anonymity, which allows them to participate freely in political 
activity without the permission or disapproval of a patriarchal culture. Second, advances 
in communications technology can help to push gender issues to the fore as in the case of 
the EZLN in Chiapas, Mexico. In groups like the FARC-EP, women are challenged to 
connect with audiences through the Internet because of the perception that the FARC is a 
violent organization that exploits its recruits.  
 
Figure 24.  Women Upper Mobility in Insurgencies in Latin America.  
This study asserts that U.S. COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been 
slow to include a gender dimension because of military regulations and cultural barriers 
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rather than tactical constraints on the battlefield. The tactics and mentality, of group think 
tainted by patriarchal attitudes towards women, hindered a potentially valuable 
understanding of human terrain gender dynamics during COIN operations. The 
aforementioned factors left half of the population free to be coerced or recruited by 
insurgents. Culture and language, of course, also handed the insurgency a huge advantage 
in gaining the confidence and support of the female population. Lessons learned from 
Afghanistan and Iraq underline the need for COIN doctrine to incorporate outreach to 
women as source of information and influence within the family nucleus. Female 
engagement is key to gather information about health, activities, and expectations 
towards governance and infrastructure activities critical to winning over “hearts and 
minds.” While a laudable initiative, the female engagement teams need clear objectives 
within an overarching plan. Otherwise, they remain an ad hoc, tardy, ill-conceived and 
clumsy effort at outreach. Patience and trial-and-error are key to determining what works 
in a specific region. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) needs to address 
gender issues to support all phases of planning of the engagement. 
Finally, culture helps to determine how women behave within the insurgencies. In 
Latin America, although women lived in patriarchal societies, the Christian religion 
provided a sense of providence and a counter point to the machismo culture M.B. Rondon 
calls this Marianism, a culturally induced view that women must be docile and tolerate 
violence against them.387 Marianismo can help to explain why women remain in the 
insurgency even if their expectations are not fulfilled or they become victims of abuse. 
The deep cultural acceptance of violence as a normative way of life requires that women 
accept their fate inside insurgencies and enables them to perform violent acts upon others 
with match, perhaps even exceed, those inflicted by their male counterparts.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Adapting to the complex operational environment requires intelligence to develop 
successful counterinsurgency approaches that integrate legitimacy, governance, and 
security. This study recommends three primary paths to develop better planning and 
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understanding about gender dimensions of COIN within the U.S. military and in the 
analysis of the human terrain. A commander’s understanding of gender and grievance can 
produce a valuable understanding of the target society, and not just the males in it. An 
awareness of the gender dimensions of COIN must be included in officer professional 
development. Ground forces commanders should incorporate females into their force 
structure during deployments and training exercises. The success of the female outreach 
in COIN depends on the feasibility, time, and flexibility of the goals established by the 
command. Building relationship with women, especially in patriarchal societies, takes 
time and commanders should be patient and understanding of the dynamics of the human 
terrain. Finally, leaders with some background in human psychology and sociology 
should be developed through broadening programs, advanced education opportunities, or 
even at the local unit level through officer development seminars or self-study. 
Efforts are under way to eliminate barriers for women in combat arms in the U.S. 
Army. This will certainly shift male perceptions, unfortunately too stubborn in this 
writer’s view, that women adapt badly to combat. The indoctrination process of basic 
training and officer basic courses need gender training to understand the complexity of 
the combat environment, but also to reduce sexual harassment and build trust between 
genders. The armed forces will be more representative of U.S. society as they include 
women in operations. This inclusion can break machista attitudes towards women, and 
therefore, break down stereotypes of women on the battlefield as violent actors. 
Ground force commanders should organize their units in a way that supports the 
integration of female in COIN and for conventional war operations. The organic 
constraints of numbers and structure could be overcome by conducting cross training of 
male and female military occupation specialties [MOS] to enable female heavy units to 
function normally when they have to perform other tasks in support of combat units. The 
issue of women in combat arms distracts from an understanding of the reality of the 
operational environment. This thesis concludes that women willingly or unwillingly join 
and fight, often tenaciously, in insurgent groups. The issue of opening many MOS in 
combat arms to women seems to be more political in nature than a lack of interest by 
women in taking on more dangerous assignments. In a recent 2014 poll, a survey of 
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Army women revealed that “less than eight percent are interested in a combat role—but 
those who say they want one of those jobs want to go right into the heart of the battle.”388 
In this writer’s opinion, the experience of COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan prove that 
women should and are an asset to ground commanders as a way to engage the people and 
understand grievances to develop better supporting tactics to counter the insurgent 
influence over the female population. 
Lastly, the professional development of the Officer Corps during the last decade 
benefited from the experience of combat operations like never before. The all-volunteer 
Army proved that it could fight and win the nation’s wars. However, the later changes in 
budget and the loss of experienced officers to the civilian workforce will hinder future 
planners and critical operational thinkers among the U.S. military. This will require an 
expansion of advance education programs as incentives to retain promising officers that 
could later serve as operational planners and strategists. As the U.S. pivots to other 
regions, it is important to have qualified planners at all levels that understand the 
importance of civilian considerations in the battlefield. Special consideration should be 
given to regional studies, social science, political science, history, gender relations, 
economy, emotional intelligence, and stabilization and reconstruction studies. The 
education and diverse experience of officers will prepare them to better conduct 
assessments of the human terrain, and translate the implications into operations. Based on 
the discussion of this thesis, gender is a factor that must be considered when planning 
conventional or unconventional operations, including effective disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration process. The study of female insurgents in Latin 
America highlights the importance of gender in support, combat, and reconstruction 
operations. 
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